The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation
An Analysis of the Brazilian Proposal in the Light of
Brazil’s Regional and International Constraints

By

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FOREWORD

Three factors have led me to make a study of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation: first of all, the Treaty represents one of the most recent international agreements, having come into force in 1980, when Venezuela ratified it; secondly, the Amazon is a very interesting area of the South American continent. The course “The Brazilian Amazon: a Case Study in Regional Development”, which integrates the Master’s degree program in Latin American Studies at Johns Hopkins University provides an indication of the international academic interest for the area; thirdly, the Treaty includes countries with which only recently Brazil has begun to cooperate more meaningfully. This analytical challenge became still more attractive during the classes of Latin American Politics (PSC 284) in George Washington University in 1979, when I became aware of some misinformation and/or misconceptions on the part of students about the Treaty. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, very few attempts were made to analyze the so-called “Amazonian Pact”, as it can be inferred from the bibliographical notes in each chapter of this work. Most of these attempts consisted of brief articles from newspapers and periodicals, which could not of course cover the subject in depth. More comprehensive works were basically addressed to the policy level while I would like to approach the subject in a more theoretical way as well as to consider points that have not been covered by other studies.

Having worked from 1974 to 1978 for the Division of Meridional America-II (responsible for bilateral relations with
Amazonian countries) of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations, I had the opportunity to see the birth of the initiative as well as to take part in the second round of negotiations in Brasilia in March, 1978. Thus, I have a clear personal interest in studying the Treaty from the academic point of view.

Believing that the study of a particular entity of the international system may provide useful insights for the study of foreign policy and international relations in general, I have made my primary goal to focus upon the particular reasons that led Brazil to propose the Pact. Although this may sound less attractive than analyzing the whole set of conditions that permitted the signing of the regional agreement, I consider the object of this study justified because of the time limit imposed on the research by my job at the Brazilian Mission to the Organization of American States from 1978 to 1982 and also because of my belief that theoretical analysis ought to be not simply attractive but above all feasible and useful. As one is generally supposed to know the reality of his own country better than that of any other country, I believe that by concentrating upon the Brazilian reasons for the proposal I may arrive at a more accurate and consequently useful work, not only for those Interested in Brazil itself but for those interested in foreign policy and international relations as a whole.

At this point I would like to express my gratefulness for the constant collaboration and support of my friends and colleagues, Minister Rubens Ricupero, Minister Jose Jeronimo Moscardo de Souza and Secretary Jose Antonio Gomes Piras. I also
Wish to thank my friend and colleague, Secretary Pedro Bretas Bastos, who brought to my knowledge the recent study of Nancy Ostrander of the U.S. Department of State on the Treaty.

Finally, although my thesis represents a personal effort to analyze the main reasons for the Brazilian proposal more deeply and to verify its consistency vis-à-vis Brazil’s attitude and behavior throughout its diplomatic history (thus requiring the frequent use of such sources as speeches made by Brazilian authorities), it should be very clear that my personal opinion is not to be taken as the official position of the country on this matter. Indeed, whereas I may coincide with the expectations of Brazilian authorities on the initiative as a response to Brazil's main concerns with its Amazonian region (if I have interpreted these expectations correctly), I still reserve my own view on the real effectiveness of the Treaty and have doubts about its immediate possibilities in terms of regional cooperation.
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CHAPTER I
THEORETICAL BASES FOR AN INTERPRETATION OF THE BRAZILIAN PROPOSAL

Various and sometimes conflicting explanations can be offered for an action taken by a country in international life, depending upon one’s preference for a given “theory”(1) of international politics, for a certain level of analysis and/or for a preliminary set of assumptions.

In order to analyze the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, one might refer to the dependency theory or to the theory of regional integration, as both occupy an important place in the literature concerning the problems of Latin America. In the case of the dependency theory, interest and scholarly debate have progressed even beyond the Latin American countries, where the majority of earlier contributions were made, according to Caporaso (2). In regard to Brazil in particular, a number of well-known studies of Brazilian problems as well as some important Brazilian scholars belong to the dependencies school (3). By referring to asymmetrical relations among nations and to center-periphery relations, the dependency theory involves the problem of vulnerability of nation’s vis-à-vis their international realm, a problem which I believe crucial for a better understanding of the proposal of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation.

Nevertheless, the theory also presents theoretical and methodological difficulties (4), among which include its scope of inquiry. In fact, writings on dependency are essentially concerned with the relations between the world’s center and its peripheries, and their consequent scope of inquiry is the North-South
one. Although circumstances associated with the North-South dimension play an important role in
the whole process leading to the Amazonian Pact, they can not be considered in isolation, for
circumstances merely associated with the regional dimension also play an important part in the same
process. Moreover, non-state entities such as manufacturers in the industrial countries or national
bourgeoisies in the peripheral areas are the type of essential entities for the dependencies school;
however, looking for those actors in the case of the Treaty would be worthless, for it consists of a
governmental initiative which bears little relation with such entities. Internal sectors will certainly tend
to play a part in the evolution of the international agreement as its initiatives of cooperation begin to
be implemented, but my focus is on the birth of the agreement itself and this ought to be approached
from a governmental perspective. Finally, the emphasis of the dependency theory upon economic
variables, such as mechanisms of accumulation (at the expense of actions undertaken for military
security purposes, e.g.) only increase the limitations of its theoretical tools for a broad and com-
prehensive analysis of the Brazilian initiative.

The second alternative to analyze the Amazonian Pact would be to do so in the light of
regionalist approaches (and possibly under a functional rather than a federal perspective, as that
Treaty seemed designed to fulfill specific technical and functional needs). First of all, one could count
on various and valuable sources, as the study of regional integration has attracted the attention of
important scholars, including some South
American ones (6). One could argue that in the Amazonian area there would not be an economic network or other preconditions to justify integration, as there was in the most studied case of the European integration. However, it should be remembered that the Amazonian area is not far worse in this regard than the rest of Latin America and, as indicated by Graciarena, integration may be promoted mainly due to intellectual and political reasons (7). Ax line also notes that participants may have gains other than the traditional welfare ones, for they can hope to achieve development and reduction of dependence (8). The assumption that countries can become more powerful if they speak as a region, with one voice, rather than dealing individually with the outside world is very relevant in order to understand the Amazonian Pact more thoroughly, as I intend to demonstrate in my work. Finally, one may recall that when the Treaty was signed, all the Chancellors referred to it as a new step in the context of other efforts towards regional integration. Besides, due to the fact that some of the studies about the Treaty approached it in the light of regionalism (9), there would seem to be much political and academic reason to refer to the theory of regional integration in order to analyze the Amazonian Pact.

I find some relevant reasons not to do so, however. In the first place, the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation is not an integrationist body in the same sense as LAFTA and the Andean Group are and Brazilian authorities have made explicit statements on this matter (10). More importantly, a number of scholars predict that regional integration tends to be successful only if a relatively high level of political integration
is undertaken at the outset (11). However, as it has been proposed and signed, “The pact would not internationalize the region or subordinate any national development plans”, according to Selcher, who observes that the perceptions of Brazilian foreign policy decision-makers are strongly influenced by a Realpolitik which regards supranationalism with suspicion (12). Indeed, taking into account that the Treaty includes the Andean countries, who led an integrationist process of their own in accordance with the prediction above, it would be a risk for Brazil to engage with such partners in a process of integration that could suffer their pro-supranationalism bias and become contrary to the Brazilian plans. As the purpose of my work is to see why Brazil proposed the Treaty, the Brazilian interpretation about the uniqueness of the pact and, above all, the country’s moderate position about integration in general make me think that there is something else in the initiative that a mere regionalist approach may not touch upon.

Another possible theory that might be referred to is the balance of power theory. Plagued by some scholars, defended by others (13), the balance of power could indeed provide a useful starting point for analyses of political events in South America as reflecting the political relations of its countries, especially the larger ones, constantly engaged in building, maintaining and defending the balance in the area. A first difficulty may arise, however, from the ambiguities that involve the concept of the balance as it has been defined and used in different ways (14). After having examined a number of definitions, Zinnes
suggests as a more generally agreeable conception that the balance of power denotes a situation which "involves a particular distribution of power among the states of the system such that no single state and no existing alliance has an “overwhelming” or “preponderant” amount of power” (15). Taking the South American subsystem as the possible “system”, the balance of power theory would then explain all the moves that created or at least tended to create that particular distribution of power.

It becomes clear from this definition that in the case of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation the theory would hardly be applicable, for even if Brazil thought of changing the distribution of power in the continent by linking itself more closely to other countries, such an alliance would have an overwhelming and preponderant amount of power in relation to the remaining South American countries. Such a move would certainly be unacceptable to Argentina and even to the Andean countries which would have no apparent reason to favor the proposed alliance. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter IV, it is highly doubtful that the contents of the Amazonian Pact would generate any kind of “alliance” that could alter the distribution of power in the region.

Some scholars consider that the balance of power, as a theoretical model, only describes the political scene of Europe in the nineteenth century or, at best, up to that time (16). I believe that the theory has a common deficiency when applied to South America, above all from the specific point of view of Brazil. Indeed, as will be further indicated in the next two
Chapters, balancing strategies seemed more typical of the past and have tended to become less and less meaningful as the country's attention gradually moved from its regional subsystem to its more global system. In order to give an indication of this tendency, Brazilian armed interventions in neighboring countries like Uruguay and Argentina (interventions being one of the usual forms to maintain a balance) only occurred during the Empire, when the regional misunderstanding was certainly at its peak.

Another limitation I find in the use of a balance of power theory comes from the fact that being a theory designed for the international system it forcefully presents inadequacies when “adapted” to pieces of that system. In fact, if, even in terms of the international system, the balance of power can be criticize to assume “that nations have no permanent ties to each other but move about freely, motivated primarily by considerations of power” (17), the same could be said with far more reason in regard to the South American subsystem. The theory loses much of its meaning and of its explanatory richness if it tries to describe and explain political events taking place in subsystems whose internal processes are strongly influenced by the more global processes of the system in which those subsystems are located. The creation of the “buffer state” of Uruguay in 1828 (the creation of buffer zones being another usual form to maintain a balance) corresponded, e.g., less to the interest of the main entities of the subsystem (Argentina or Brazil) than to the interest of England, a power that played a significant role in pressing those two countries to agree with that measure.
As a result of the different uses of the term balance of power, the theory has sometimes moved from its systemic level of analysis to a state level and become then a synonym for power politics in general (18). Taking the search for power as a common practice of the entities of the international system, scholars like Morgenthau assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power and, as a result, the concept of interest should be the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics (19). I doubt, however, that the move from the systemic level (balance of power) to the state level (power politics) may improve the usefulness of the theory as a basis for the analysis of the Amazonian Pact. On the one hand, a possible advantage of the assumption above has been to avoid the popular fallacy of equating the foreign policy of a statesman with his philosophic or political sympathies (a fallacy which would furthermore require intensive and hardly conclusive investigations about personal motivation to explain political facts); on the other hand, the same assumption seems to have led to another fallacy which I would define as the tendency to translate the search for power into the search for conquest and hegemony and interpret as such every process of cooperation between parties whose capacity is different or supposedly so.

Given this tendency to generalize about countries in terms of “conquerors” or “dealers” (merely interested in selling their products or services), it is not surprising that Brazil has been often defined as expansionist and sub imperialist, an interpre-
tation that was possibly corroborated by other specific factors. First of all, there is the historical fact that Brazil was the only country in South America to be governed by an Emperor. This situation contributed to a series of misunderstandings about the Brazilian foreign policy in the past (analyzed in Chapter II) as well as to the use of the label “imperialist” to qualify the more recent Brazilian governments, as if old imperial attitudes and goals remained unchangeable over the years. Secondly, almost deterministic interpretations of Brazil’s large territory and natural resources (20) have tended to exaggerate the size and the expectations of the “giant”. The version of a Brazilian “manifest destiny” was still reinforced by the military government that has been ruling the country since 1964 and by the impressive economic growth achieved by Brazil from 1968 to 1974. When it comes to the former, typical military concerns with power make it quite natural to hypothesize that a military government will show an inclination for a policy of national aggrandizement at the expense of other countries. Specific geopolitical works of Brazilian authors, especially the ones made by important members of the government like General Couto e Silva (21), have also contributed to provoking a jump from an imagined hypothesis to a reality which is taken for granted. Finally, the recent economic growth of Brazil and the emphasis given by Brazilian authorities to development as a national goal have been explored as an undeniable sign of intended expansionism not only by those who would be directly affected by such an expansionism but also by those who would be interested in disseminating a general alarm about it (22).
Since the emphasis upon economic aspects characterizes many global approaches to Brazilian domestic and foreign policies (23), it is scarcely surprising to see the same emphasis in the case of works devoted to more specific topics. Being a very recent--and innovative--initiative, the Amazonian Pact gives rise to a temptation for analysts to simply interpret it on the basis of generalized assumptions about Brazilian behavior. In an article published some months after the signing of the Treaty, Vivian Trias observes, for instance, that the “power and expansionist vocation” of Brazil provokes considerable fear, as a very large portion of the Brazilian territories in the Amazonian area had been conquered from the neighboring countries, according to the author, by the “insatiable, persistent and able” diplomacy of Brazil. She adds that the geopolitics of General Couto e Silva would be one of the factors that “prove” the “imperial vocation” of Brazil (24).

It is my impression that such consideration reveals at best a very limited and rigid approach and at worsts a deliberate intention to stimulate suspicions about initiatives of cooperation such as the Amazonian Pact. To some extent, those considerations may reflect two analytical errors. One error would be to devote excessive attention to outdated regional rivalries and the other would be to apply to different reality theoretical assumptions about the struggle for power which was characteristic of distinct historical and political contexts (25). As to the first error, I will point out in Chapters II and III how regional constraints have tended to become less pressing and important.
for Brazil, throughout its history. As to the second error, it is useful to recall Arnold Woofer’s “theory of ends”. According to the late scholar, to treat the quest for power positively or negatively, outside the context of ends and purposes which it is expected to serve robs it of any intelligible meaning and also makes it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness. With this in mind, he proposes to classify the goals of foreign policy under the headings of goals of national “self-extension” (all policy objectives expressing a demand for values not already enjoyed, i.e., a change of the status quo), national “self-preservation” (demands pointing toward the maintenance, protection, or defense of the status quo), and national “self-abnegation” (goals that transcend and even sacrifice the “national interest” (26).

Taking Woofer’s classification into account, I consider Brazil's attitude and behavior within its regional realm as reflecting goals of self-preservation. In fact, if the country has recently demanded a change of status quo, this has basically occurred with respect to the international realm, especially in the context of the North-South dialogue (27).

In terms of its regional realm, Brazil tends to be held back from hegemonic or expansionist intentions by the conceptual positions it has to assume and by the practical limitations it faces (28). By denying power policies and hegemonic directions at the regional level, Brazilian authorities try, in my view, not only to improve the receptivity of its neighbors to joint initiatives of cooperation like the Amazonian Treaty (and warn
against any hegemonic intention on their part) but also to show coherence with their usual condemnation of hegemonic schemes at the international level in the benefit of the big powers and at the expense of countries like Brazil (29). Although many, if not all other international entities, also tend to declare their respect for non-intervention, national independence and other idealistic principles, declarations against hegemonic schemes seem more sound in the case of weaker entities, for those principles are in keeping with their effective interest, as was well pointed out by the Brazilian Professor of International Law, Celso Albuquerque Mello (30). Finally, the limitations faced by Brazil to achieve its national goals serve as a practical obstacle against hegemonic dreams on the part of its authorities--apparently aware of those limitations--and reinforce the substance of the rhetorical position contrary to hegemonies, a position that though still questioned and doubted by many has also been recognized by several others (31).

I would risk to generalize that power politics may be really misleading when applied not simply to Brazil but to other developing countries, if not all (as well as Brazil, Venezuela is sometimes assumed to be avid for domination within the Amazonian context) (32). Recalling the "theory of ends", no matter how theoretically useful approaches based on a generalized “struggle for power” may be, analytical distortions arise if an important distinction is not made between the “struggle to dominate” and the “struggle to avoid domination”. Approaches of this sort tend to oversimplify the stimuli for a political decision and to
examine a given question under the assumption of a mere conflict of interests between two or more entities directly involved. Because of this simplistic assumption, many initiatives of horizontal cooperation have been precipitately interpreted as manifestations of ‘sub imperialism’. As a result, the real aims of those initiatives are not emphasized while the concept of imperialism is misused sometimes (33). Moreover, as there is a general tendency to recognize strong signs of interdependence among nations in the present world structure (34), there would be no apparent reason to prevent one from expecting growing interdependence in the near future and, consequently, less space for hegemonic powers. This seems exactly to be the pragmatic conception of the Brazilian foreign policy, as the present Chancellor of Brazil expressed the need for a diplomacy “that escapes from the ways of hegemonic intention, that escapes from the repetition of the vices which have historically marked the behavior of the powers” (35). In other words, as expressed by its former Chancellor, Brazil refuses itself to be dominated as well as to dominate (36).

If the use of power politics may be put into doubt from a general point of view, the value of that analytical tool becomes still more doubtful to explain the Brazilian behavior in the specific case of the Amazonian Treaty. No matter whether it is said that the Brazilian foreign policy lacks further conceptualization at the multilateral level or whether different causes are suggested, the fact remains that a number of scholars have already detected the country’s tendency to devote more attention
to the bilateral level and to leave the multilateral level as a kind of complementary or reinforcing stage (37). One of those scholars properly notes then that the only surprising element in the Amazonian Pact was the multilateral nature of the proposal, given Brasilia’s preference to deal with countries on a bilateral basis and its reluctance to become actively involved in regional organizations (38). Thus, if regional domination or “imperialism” were the primary goals of the Brazilian proposal, I would describe it as an unnecessary and counterproductive initiative, for it would be better to continue to deal with the Amazonian countries on a bilateral basis and to avoid the possible troubles of a multilateral forum, whose political dynamics is far more difficult to control, especially by a developing country with its own internal difficulties (39).

The approach I suggest to analyze and understand the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation attempts to overcome the deficiencies as well as to make the best possible use of the contributions of some specific works and of the general theories mentioned before and afterwards. I have been inspired by some theoretical observations of Professor Kenneth Waltz and, in particular by one specific passage of his work. In this passage, which I will now quote, Waltz provides a fine interpretation, from a global or systemic point of view, of the European process of regional integration:

So long as European states were the world’s great powers, unity among them could only be dreamt of... The emergence of the Russian and American superpowers created a situation that permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western
Europe… These new circumstances made possible the famous “upgrading of the common interest”, Living in the “superpowers’ shadow, Britain, France, Germany and Italy quickly saw that war among them would be fruitless and soon began to believe it impossible. Because the security of all of them came to depend ultimately on the policy of others, rather than on their own, unity could effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved (40).

It is my feeling that the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation may be interpreted in a similar way, at least in regard to the country which proposed it. Of course, neither Brazil nor any one of its neighbors have ever been competing “great powers” of a multipolar international system as in the example above, for they were “poles” only in a very limited sense, once their subsystem as a whole and each of them in particular was affected by real poles located outside the boundaries of their subsystem. Even so the challenges and rivalries that characterized the regional scene are relatively comparable to the European ones as an obstacle against integration or other forms of cooperation at a higher level, especially in terms of the perceptions that South American entities had in relation to each other.

Taking then the regional subsystem and the international system as parallel “sets of constraining conditions” (41) …which affect the entity that interests me and to whose pressures that entity should respond, I will try to approach the Amazonian Pact from the perspective of these two dimensions (42). My intention is to account for the role played by both dimensions in as a systematic way as possible along a historical continuum. Nevertheless, whereas I base my own analysis upon the assumption that
facts of forces located at the systemic level are the most relevant for international politics, I will not make a systemic analysis because, even if I expect to infer from the Brazilian case some conclusions that might be relevant from a general point of view, I am principally interested in studying one specific Brazilian initiative and, as Waltz himself asserts, a systems theory cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the entities of a system will respond to its pressures and possibilities (43). Indeed, levels of analysis of a more reductionism kind have to be accounted for, as references are made to the perceptions of policy-makers and to national goals. The identification of basic national goals is important to better understand Brazilian attitude and behavior. I consider sovereignty and development, especially the former, as the main national goals of Brazil. Sovereignty is a fundamental requirement for the juridical existence of any state while development may also be understood not as an end in itself but as a means to achieve or reinforce sovereignty. Besides, some of the obstacles to Brazilian politics of development may be regarded as real challenges to the country’s sovereignty. The choice of just those goals (44) may sound arbitrary, but it reflects the need for some theoretical simplification, in order to facilitate possible comparisons and generalizations. Given those goals, I will group into a single type all the constraining conditions that the regional and the international realms pose to them. When the conditions constraining the achievement of the Brazilian goals at the state level or the perception of its achievement at the
individual level are located in the immediate neighborhood of the country (South America) I will call them the regional constraint. When they are located outside that immediate neighborhood, I will call them the international constraint. The choice of South America as the regional subsystem is not aprioristic and results from Brazil's geographical location as well as from the historical situation which will be examined in Chapter II.

I should finally add that the emphasis and continuity I attribute to those constraints seem in harmony with other authors' acknowledgement of the role of external factors. Peter Gourevitch states that the international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of them (45). Organ ski says that the very idea that a nation's particular international goal was desirable may have come from outside (46). I assume that the role of external factors is especially relevant in the case of entities--such as Brazil--which are more sensitive to the influence of those external factors. In fact, referring once again to Waltz’s work and recalling his analogy between the international system and the international market, it seems logical to assume that small firms will be more sensitive to market pressures than the larger ones (47).

Notes

(1)The inverted commas are used merely to reflect the controversies about what effectively constitutes theory in the international political field, as discussed by Stanley Hoffman and other contributors in International Politics and Foreign Policy: a Reader in Research and Theory, ed. by James Rosenau (rev. ed.; New York: The Free Press, 1969).


(5) Thomas C. Bruneau and Philippe Faucher, “Introduction”, in *Authoritarian Capitalism*, ed. by Bruneau and Faucher (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 4. As recognized in this book, the dependency school is the broadest theoretical or conceptual approach to considerations such as the mechanisms of accumulation in peripheral societies, inflation, search for monetary stability, systems of production, and foreign investment.


(10) Rubens Ricupero, “Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica” (Conference made before the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives of Brazil on May 9, 1979).

Recuperate, who is now Head of the Department of Americas of Itamaraty, was then Head of the Division of Meridional America-II in charge of Brazilian relations with Amazonian countries. Similar views are found in “Tratado Amazónico No Es Nuevo Pacto de Integración Económica,” El Telégrafo (Guayaquil), Jul. 8, 1978; and in Robert D. Bond, “Venezuela, Brazil, and the Amazon Basin”, in Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, ed. by Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln (Boulders West-view Press, 1981), p. 159. Bond finds it an exaggeration to call the proposed Amazonian Pact an integration movement, for the draft treaty does not create a supranational organization to implement the agreements, no regional development agencies, banks, or research institutes are specifically created, and the working of the Treaty makes clear that the major development projects for the Amazon are the province of each sovereign nation individually.


(12) Wayne A. Selcher, Brazil’s Multilateral Relations: Between First and Third Worlds (Boulder: West-view Press, 1978), pp. 266 and 279. The Brazilian view on integration is expressed by the speech made by Chancellor Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro on October 30, 1980, during the Seminar on Latin American Integration, sponsored by the House of Representatives of Brazil. The Chancellor stressed that the integrationist movement should not aim at substituting the state or at changing the rules of sovereignty.


(14) This ambiguity is analyzed in Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962) and in Ernst B. Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda?”, World Politics, V (July 1953).


(21) A more realistic approach is made by Riordan Roett who says that “gross data about Brazil’s size and importance can obscure important shortcomings”. (“Brazilian Foreign Policy: Options in the 1980s, “in *Authoritarian Capitalism*, ed. by Bruneau and Faucher, p. 192, n. 7).


(26) Wayne A. Selcher avoids the second error by noting that to speak of “dominance” or “consolidation of hegemony”, based
on geopolitical designs is an overstatement and an unwarranted transposition to South America of the conflicful atmosphere of highly competitive national security politics more characteristic of some other regions of the world. (“Brazil in the World: Multipolarity as Seen by a Peripheral ADC Middle Power”, in Foreign Policies, ed. by Ferris and Lincoln, p. 84).


(28) Suffice it to see the speeches made by Brazilian Chancellors before the General Assemblies of the United Nations.

(29) A rhetorical manifestation is found in the speech made by President João Batista Figueiredo before the Congress of Colombia on March 11, 1981 (Mimeographed copy). On more practical grounds, Rubens Ricupero recognizes that Brazil is “not only by conviction but also by interest” a nation which is totally committed to the principle of the intangibility of agreements and regards with reservation any interest of expansionism (“As Relações do Brasil com os EUA e a América Latina”, conference made at the Institute for International Affairs, in Caracas, on March 1, 1978). In terms of domestic problems, Wayne Selcher acknowledges that Brazilian diplomats are well aware of their national limitations and of the common counter productivity and unpredictability of influence attempts by major states. He adds that “Brazil consistently condemns hegemonies, interventionism, and the use of force”. (“ADC Middle Power”, p. 89). A similar view is found in Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder: West-view Press, 1976), pp. 32 and 40.


(32) The signing of the Treaty itself demonstrates the improvement of the Brazilian image in the eyes of its neighbors, for, as commented by the former Ecuadorian Chancellor Ayala Lasso, in an interview to the press, there would be no agreement if this was the expression of a hegemonic intention on the part of any country (“Pacto Amazónico se Basa en la Igualdad”, El


(34) I tend to agree with the Ecuadorian economist Germanico Salgado Pena (ex-member of the Junta of the Cartagena Agreement) when, in an interview, he considered entirely illusory an hegemonic intention on the part of any Latin American country, no matter how big. Salgado correctly asserted that traditional imperialisms are more effective and real (see Gustavo Gonzales Rodríguez, “El Pacto Amazónico, una Tarea a Largo Plazo”, Hoy (La Paz), Aug. 16, 1978).

(35) In his review essay, mentioned in n. 4 supra, Kal J. Holsti estimates with much reason that interdependence is a limited reality and “dependence… remains the reality for a majority of the new states…” (“Complex Interdependence”, p. 514).

(36) Conference about the Brazilian foreign policy in Escola Superior de Guerra (High Military School), on July 13, 1979.
Reproduced in Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, Nº 22 (July/September 1979), p. 32.

(37) “The Brazilian Foreign Policy”, speech made by Chancellor Antônio Azeredo da Silveira (Mimeographed copy, n.d.).


(40) Waltz, International Politics, pp. 70-71.

(41) Ibid, p. 73.

(42) Different political dimensions have been studied occasionally, as in Ferris and Lincoln, ed., Foreign Policies; Selcher, Multilateral Relations; and in Celso Lafer and Felix Peña, Argentina e Brasil no Sistema das Relações Internacionais (São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 1973).

(43) Waltz, International Politics, p. 71. Another source on what a systemic approach can and can not do is J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations” in International Politics, ed. by Rosenau, pp. 20-29.


(46) Organski, World Politics, p. 89

CHAPTER II

THE REGIONAL CONSTRAINT

As it has been suggested earlier, an entity of the international system faces a number of constraints in its more immediate subsystem, which, in the case of Brazil, is represented by its closer geographical neighborhood. I will focus upon some specific examples of what I define as the regional constraint of Brazilian foreign policy, i.e., the specific cases which were interpreted as a threat to the sovereignty and often to the very territorial integrity of the country. From the days of the Brazilian independence up to present time, I have selected examples of a perceived attempt on the part of Hispanic nations to join their efforts against the interests of Brazil. More recent cases seem to indicate that the overall framework for cooperation among the South American countries has improved while political suspicions have considerably decreased from one end to the other. Whether and to what extent such a phenomenon has contributed to the proposal of the Amazonian Pact is an important question that will also be examined.

The Iberian Heritage

The new nations that declared their independence in relation to Portugal and Spain in the early nineteenth century did so only to a certain extent. Politically, many attitudes and values traditionally assumed by those two countries continued to be the main attitudes and values held by the new nations in relation to each other as if they remained as territorial projec-
tions of a relationship which took place in a different subsystem. This continuity, which is mentioned by many scholars (1), has contributed to provoke the political concerns and suspicions exhibited by the new ruling groups in terms of their neighbors.

Teixeira Soares, for instance, notes that the suspicions of the neighboring countries, in regard to Brazil’s attitude, behavior and aims were enormous. According to him, traditional prejudices of the Spanish people against the Portuguese were re-established among the new nations of Hispanic culture and were directed against the Empire of Brazil (2). On its part, Brazil has sometimes followed the political orientation of Portugal, according to Renato de Mendonça. The author explains that by incorporating the Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay) into the Empire as the Cisplatina Province, Brazil acquired a kind of territorial dispute which was customary in Europe but practically unknown in the American continent in general. He adds that D. João VI (the Portuguese Monarch who came to Brazil in 1808, fourteen years before the Brazilian independence) thought in European terms and, as a consequence, had in mind especially the notion of the “natural limit”.

The application of that European notion to Portuguese America consisted of the return to the borders of the Plata River or, in other words, the occupation of the Banda Oriental. In order to give another testimony of the inherited Iberian suspicions, Mendonça quotes the following comments of the Paraguayan historian Julio Cesar Chaves:

To regard the Portuguese with fear was a heritage which came from the colonial times, when Hispanic America considered the policy of the Portuguese Mon-
archs as ambitious and eager for conquest and its (Brazilian) vassals as suspicious. During the time of the (national) revolution... one of the most terrible weapons which were used in terms of international intrigue was the connivance with the Court in Rio de Janeiro: a lot of revolutions in the Plata region were spread over the population on the basis of such an accusation... The easiest and quickest way to overthrow a government was to circulate the information that it was on the side of Portugal (3).

A final reference to the Iberian heritage is found in the work of the Brazilian historian Pedro Calmon, who conceptualizes the Portuguese and the Brazilian systems as two distinct systems and says that the Cisplatina was a consequence of the former system, whose starting point had a remote date (1679) and the tragic episode of the Colônia do Sacramento for which the Portuguese and the Spanish have constantly battled in the past (4). Many other historians could be cited, but the ones I have mentioned seem to illustrate the problem sufficiently. The Portuguese-Spanish traditional rivalry contributed to create a kind of vicious circle, as the new nations went to the extreme of intervening with each other in order to prevent a suspected aggression; as a consequence, these interventions led to further misunderstanding and to growing suspicions about the purposes of each government.

Of course, other factors may have contributed to the proliferation of such suspicions. Among these factors, the interests of the powers outside the region have played, in my view, a fundamental role in stimulating misunderstanding, and the apparent regional “power struggle” which included ostensive interferences of one new nation in the internal affairs of the other. In this regard, it is useful to quote the following
passages about the policies of England and other powers:

By alternatively pressuring either the Empire (of Brazil) or the Republic (of Argentina), whether to lead them to war, … , or to force them to negotiate a peaceful settlement, … , England succeeded to preventing Argentina from fully dominating the Plata River and in preventing Brazil from arriving at the border of Paraná, by means of the creation, between both nations, of a small state (Uruguay) which was, … , an eternal source of divergence to increase their rivalry and to weaken them by means of constant wars (5).

By that time, North American diplomacy made serious efforts to obtain the navigation in the Amazon for itself. Thus: … the North American diplomacy of President Pierce tried to neutralize the diplomatic action of the Empire in Latin American capitals. This occurred in Bogota where opposed interests were brought together to support the campaign of Senator Fernandez Madrid against the treaties signed by Miguel Maria Lisboa (the Brazilian special Envoy) and Lorenzo Marias Lleras (the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs) in 1853 (6).

The French representatives intervened openly in the domestic polities of the region. In the Plata River area, they supported Juan Lavalle and Fructuoso Rivera against Juan Manuel de Rosas and Oribe and projected the establishment of a protectorate or colony (7).

It is not of the scope of this work to investigate which factor played the greatest role in producing the historical regional frictions among the new nations. Suffice it to emphasize the situation itself in order to better understand the orientation followed by Brazilian policy-makers in relation to its neighbors and vice-versa.

An Empire Surrounded by Republics

Beginning in 1822, the attention of the Brazilian diplomacy was initially devoted to the international recognition of the country’s independence from Portugal and subsequently to the definition of its territorial limits with the neighboring countries. According to Hélio Vianna, the difficulties for the
recognition were numerous, owing to the Portuguese opposition and to the links between Portugal and England, as well as to the policy followed by the European powers that made up the Holy Alliance and were opposed to the liberation of the colonies in the American continent (8). The United States was the first country to recognize Brazilian independence (although it complained about the monarchical system of government in Brazil) in 1824. In 1825, England, Portugal, and other European countries also recognized the independence. South American nations did so as well by the same time.

Despite the international scope of the first Brazilian diplomatic challenge and of other important challenges some of which I will discuss in Chapter III--there is no doubt that the Brazilian foreign policy had to concentrate its attention on its regional realm during practically the whole period of the Empire (1822 - 1889) and for a considerable part of the Republic. When it comes to the former period, I can cite Teixeira Soares and Lewis A. Tambs, who mention the need to stabilize Brazil’s far-flung Northern frontier, even when the Plata affairs claimed for immediate defense, as the diplomatic action in the Southern subregion obliged simultaneously to defend the Brazilian interests in the Northern area (9). Renato de Mendonça stresses the subregional problems by noting that the Empire had the attention of its rulers--“the best considerations of its state counselors"--deeply devoted to the questions of the Plata area, first in Uruguay, later in Argentina, and finally in Paraguay. He adds that the “miracle of the Brazilian geographical unity” was far
from effective by that time. Indeed, the problems faced by the country were not only restricted to the definition of its territorial limits—a problem I have previously mentioned—but also to the integration of a number of Brazilian peripheral regions to their national center or core region.

Mendonça makes a specific reference to the central state of Mato Grosso, where it was extremely difficult to arrive, even through the Paraguay River (10). On his part, Teixeira Soares comments on the unfavorable conditions of the Amazonian area as a whole, where the national boundaries were “poorly guarded, poorly populated, poorly defended” (11) a problem that, I should say, has persisted up to the present day.

Thus, the internal situation of the country was one to make its policy-makers particularly aware of its vulnerability and of the seriousness of any external threats to the Brazilian integrity. The Iberian heritage of rivalry and mutual suspicions will play then a special role to avoid what should be a natural process of regional understanding and cooperation among new nations which had a number of common problems and needed, as a consequence, the support of each other. Vieira de Mello observes that, contrary to what many authors have thought and made known, the Imperial government was officially sympathetic to the revolutionary movements in neighboring countries, as they were fighting against the same reactionary forces that did not want to recognize Brazilian independence (12). Teixeira Soares also denies emphatically that Brazil has ever looked for “dynastic alliances” or the support of European powers. He thinks that
the country followed a realistic policy, “eminently American” (i.e., of a basic continental scope), and that the concern of the main policy-makers in the first years of independence consisted of neutralizing the recolonization plans of the Holy Alliance. In spite of that, the same author observes that Hispanic America regarded the Brazilian Empire with enormous suspicion and feared that the Brazilian Court might have expansionist plans towards its neighbors. If there was no open hostility against the Empire, the suspicions and preconceptions were such that the Brazilian diplomacy had to work intensely to improve the bilateral relationship with the new nations (13). Pedro Calmon, who correctly said that the Portuguese system had the imperial sense of expansion while the Brazilian system had the national sense of preservation also notes that the “America of recent Republics” reacted negatively to the establishment of an Emperor who was: a) Portuguese, b) erroneously regarded as the instrument of a king who had carried on an inflexible Portuguese policy against the Spanish king, c) son-in-law of the Austrian Emperor, and, d) as a “strong man”, a dangerous exception in a framework of “caudillos” and weak nationalities (14). In sum: the Brazilian diplomacy faced a situation of complex antagonism which tended to increase the concerns provoked by the problems of integration of the country and the need for a definition of its political geographical limits.

In such a context, the former Banda Oriental (present-day Uruguay) was a special source of concern to the Brazilian authorities. Even before the Brazilian independence, the Uruguayan
“caudillo” Artigas planned to enlarge the territory of the Banda Oriental by incorporating the area corresponding to Paraguay, the Argentinian, Provinces of Corrientes and Entre Rios, and the Brazilian Southern state of Rio Grande do Sul, according to the Uruguayan historians Eduardo Acevedo and J. Miguel Díaz Ferreira, cited by Renato de Mendonça (15). Later, in 1834, the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Relations, Lucas J. Obes planned to promote the formation of a Hispanic league which would discuss the disputed territories with the Empire, as almost all the South American countries had not yet determined their territorial limits with Brazil and would then benefit from a joint effort that tended to strengthen their negotiating position. When they discovered in 1835 that Uruguay was attempting to gather support for such a plan from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, the Brazilian authorities immediately proposed the establishment of negotiations for a definitive agreement on limits with the Uruguayan government, which could not postpone the negotiations proposed and therefore abandoned its plan (16). From 1835 to 1845 the Brazilian Empire was greatly disturbed by a domestic revolution (the so-called Revolução Farroupilha). Which involved the Southern states of Rio Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina, where two Republics were proclaimed by the revolutionaries. Calógeras notes that the revolutionaries were federalists rather than separatists (17). The fact remains that they counted on the support of the Uruguayan leader Fructuoso Rivera and this made evident to the Empire the risk of having a hostile government in the neighboring country.
Despite all these direct threats, the main challenge to the Brazilian security and integrity came indirectly from Uruguay, by the time that nation was incorporated into Brazil as the Cisplatina Province. In 1825, the government of Buenos Aires proclaimed the Cisplatina was part of the United Provinces of the Plata River (Argentina) and the Brazilian Empire reacted by declaring war to the neighboring country. Argentina tried then to obtain the support of Bolivar and the rumors and intrigues that involved the most serious threat of a Hispanic alliance against Brazil were such that many works I had the opportunity to read about this episode oscilated between a prudent silence vis-à-vis the problem and visible exaggeration and distortions, while few analysis appeared accurate and reliable. On the basis of the letters written by Bolivar, it seems true that he regarded the Brazilian Empire with serious concern. In a letter to Sucre, for instance, he said that the Holy Alliance would provide troops to the Empire in order to subjugate Hispanic America. In another letter to Santander, he showed the same concern and estimated that Brazil could wage a successful war on the Hispanic states, starting in Buenos Aires and ending up in the Andean nations (18). In spite of this certain concern, it seems already an exaggeration to say that Bolivar “offered” his support to Buenos Aires, as stated in Alberdi’s work (19). Other works state that Bolivar did not attribute aggressive goals to the Brazilian government (20) and that he was slightly favorable to Buenos Aires (21). Both statements appear to be another exaggeration which would tend to erroneously minimize
the danger of a Bolivarian intervention.

In fact, the danger existed and was increased by a parallel episode, which is not well-known and referred to the occupation of the Bolivian province of Chiquitos by a military force sent by the Governor of the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso in 1825. Important general works about the Brazilian diplomatic history, such as the ones written by Delgado de Carvalho and Hélio Vianna (22), pay almost no attention to that episode. Although it deserved a detailed study from a few authors, the episode of Chiquitos had considerable repercussion in the complex political framework of that time. Many, of course, immediately saw it as a manifestation of the expansionism of the Empire. Indeed, as recognized by the Bolivian historian Vásquez-Machicado, quoted by Vieira de Mello, the occupation of that province (requested by the pro-Spain Governor of Chiquitos, Sebastián Ramos, to the Governor of Mato Grosso, in order to protect the province against the revolutionary movement of independence) did not count on an authorization or even on a tacit agreement of the Emperor, who ordered the evacuation of the Brazilian troops when he knew what the authorities of Mato Grosso had done (23). Another Bolivian author also commented about Chiquitos that Brazil was not devoted to conquests nor did it want to wage war on the new nations (24). In his letters, Bolivar himself doubted whether the invasion of Chiquitos consisted of a decision of the Empire, recommended by the Holy Alliance. In order to be absolutely safe, nonetheless, he urged for the meeting of American countries in Panama.
The Congress of Panama, held in 1826, intended to form alliances among the new nations of the American continent in order to assure their recent independence. On this matter, I quote Lewis A. Tambst:

Bolivar preferred to await the convening of that Congress before taking action. Distrusting both Portuguese and Anglo America, he had pointedly excluded both Brazil and the United States from the initial invitation list. Moreover, he was confident that the delegates from the Spanish American Republics would... endow him with firm authority under a defensive-offensive alliance negotiated between the nations of the coming Spanish American Confederation (25).

Souza Braga also stresses that, during an initial period, the Iberian Pan Americanism was exclusively Hispanic (26). Later, invitations were extended to Brazil and the United States, but both countries did not take part in the Congress. After having initiated his trip, the Brazilian envoy received orders to return because of an antimonarchical manifestation of the Colombian plenipotentiary in Washington as well as because of the Empire’s belief that the Congress would discuss the question of Cisplatina. Curiously enough, some authors say that Argentina did not go to Panama either (where only Mexico, Central America, Colombia and Peru participated in the meeting) precisely because the Colombian government was said not to have agreed to transform the Congress into an alliance against the Empire (27).

Besides his purpose to await the convening of the Congress of Panama, Bolivar did not decide to take action against Brazil because he feared an imagine.
Anglo-Brazilian alliance and the Protection the Emperor of Brazil would receive from England, according to Tambs (28). Vieira de Mello also refers to England as a conditioning factor and adds two other reasons: the opposition of Santander (the Vice President of Gran Colombia) and the respect of Bolivar for the laws of Colombia, as he told the Argentinian envoys that he could not personally dispose of the Colombian troops (29). The fact remains that the threat of a Bolivarian intervention was seriously feared by Brazil. So much so that Charles Stuart, the British representative in Rio de Janeiro mentioned in one of his notes that such an intervention “had alarmed the Brazilian government to the point that the Ministers frequently tried to call my attention to this matter” (30).

Two other threats during the Empire can be mentioned. One is the attempt of the Argentinian Head of State, Juan Manuel Rosas (1835-1852), to re-establish the former Virreinato Del Plata by incorporating the territories of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay into Argentina. Brazilian policy-makers like Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro and Paulino de Souza realized that it would be preferable to negotiate bilaterally with those individual nations than with a Virreinato re-established and hostile to Brazil. A strong Hispanic confederation, as the one intended by Rosas, would further complicate the problems of geographical limits as well as those of navigation through the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers, without which the Empire would lose its already fragile communication with Mato Grosso and other states. The second threat is the attempt of the Paraguayan Head State Francisco Solano Lopez, (1862-1870), to enlarge his country on a very similar basis to what Artigas had intended to do in relation to Uruguay.
some decades before, as Lopez’s projected enlargement involved the conquest of part of the Brazilian territory. Lopez’s attempt was politically frustrating to Brazil in view of the previous efforts made by the Empire to assure the independence and the friendship of Paraguay, as described by Soars de Souza (31).

Those two attempts ultimately led to war between Brazil and its neighbors. It is interesting to note, on the basis of most of the works I consulted, that Brazil has not apparently obtained any territorial or economic benefit from those wars. Donald Dozer affirms, for instance, that Brazilian prosperity was, on the contrary, seriously affected by the war against Paraguay and that the opening of the Paraguay River to navigation brought more benefit to Buenos Aires and Montevideo (32). Still worse is the fact that the Brazilian armed interventions in both cases did not eliminate or reduce the regional constraint. Indeed, even the apparent opposition of Brazil to territorial retaliation after the war against Paraguay had the effect of thwarting some Argentinian expectation and of stimulating the Argentinian press in 1872 to recall the Bolivarian feelings vis-à-vis Brazil by warning the Empire, “surrounded by Republics, with which it constantly battles because of geographical limits” that the Plata questions might become American questions (33).

The Projection of the Regional Constraint
If in subsequent periods, effective attempts to join the Hispanic American nations in a common front against Brazil were not very frequent nor as declared as the ones described above, it is no less true that the regional constraint has not ceased to exist. Even after the replacement of the Imperial government by a new Republican regime, the Brazilian image has not improved in the eyes of most South American countries, where ideas and plans hostile to Brazil continued to exist and were intensely exploited from time to time. This in turn only increased the Brazilian sensibility to the regional constraint, especially while there was ground for territorial disputes. As well noted by Bradford Burns, the principal international problem facing Brazil in the early 1900s was the demarcation of its boundaries (34).

Having in mind the role played by the Baron of Rio Branco in solving the main problems of boundaries, I think it useful to quote the following passages of the important study made by Burns about the former Brazilian Chancellor and his policy:

Practical international politics of the hemisphere further dictated that Brazil should be friendly toward the United States. Spanish-speaking countries surrounded Brazil on three sides. Brazil had fought against several of them and had experienced boundary problems with all of them. Throughout the nineteenth century, the power politics of South America had taught Brazil to be suspicious of her Spanish-speaking neighbors. Rio Branco, constantly wary of their intrigues, neither liked nor trusted them … The Baron believed that within the Latin American community of nations Brazil lived in an 'atmosphere of hate and prejudices' created by her jealous neighbors. Mutual suspicions between Spanish-speaking countries and their single Portuguese-speaking neighbor ran deep.

Burns recognizes, however, that
Rio Branco, a pragmatist in diplomacy, found it expedient to live as harmoniously as possible with his neighbors, and despite his personal feelings he did as much as possible to maintain friendly relations with them. His Pan American sentiments were genuine (35).

In the solution to the question of the boundaries, Rio
Branco, like his predecessors, was especially aware of the regional constraint and followed the policy of never conducting multinational boundary conferences. Brazil defended the juridical principle of *until possidetis de facto* for the establishment of its geographical limits whereas each neighboring country defended the principle of *uti possidetis de jure*. (36) If a common front was formed by those countries, negotiations would naturally become harder for Brazil. The main threat of such a front was the settlement of the dispute with Bolivia, because of the possible involvement of Peru. (37) According to Teixeira Soares, the agreement with Bolivia in 1903 provoked a wave of negative comments about Rio Branco’s diplomacy in several Hispanic-American capitals and, in Lima, the occupation of the litigious area between Brazil and Peru was even preached, in order to try to force Brazil to discuss its boundary problems with Peru and Bolivia at the same time. (38) As a matter of fact, this attempt had a historical precedent, for from 1868 to 1874 the Peruvian Chancery had tried without success to convince the Empire to agree with the promotion of a conference of triple arbitration, which would solve the problems of limits among Peru, Bolivia and Brazil.

Besides a closer relationship with the United States, Brazilian policy-makers have tended to react to the regional constraint by means of activities of bilateral cooperation with each Spanish-speaking country and, at the multilateral level, by means, of a rhetorical support to Pan Americanism as a safer substitute or alternative to Bolivarism. In spite of the
Benefits brought by Pan Americanism, small divergences were enough to bring back traditional rivalries and suspicions. This would be the case of the V Pan American Conference, held in Santiago, in 1923, when the difficulties to arrive at an agreement about the reduction of arms among the American republics, as proposed by Brazil, led to “in justified alarm on the part of the continental press” (39) about the Brazilian intentions.

More problems still came between 1945 and 1955, when the Argentinian President Juan Domingo Perón revived the age old dream of Buenos Aires of reuniting the former viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Both Tambs and Vieira de Mello make reference to the episode and the Brazilian author notes that the attempt to rehabilitate the memory of Juan Manuel Rosas (Lucio M. de Moreno Quintana, then the Director of the Diplomatic School in Argentina, was one of the main exponents of such attempt) represented an antipathetic doctrine towards Brazil. Vieira de Mello also calls attention to the republication of the almost one-century old work El Imperio del Brasil ante la Democracia de America, in 1946. The author, Juan Alberdi, was one of the most severe critics of Brazil in Argentina, and his revived thesis received great support in the Argentinean press. (40)

As it is also pointed out by Tambs, in the following passage, another challenge emerged in the North simultaneously, as Venezuelan development seemed to increase:

Concurrently, reports of a Venezuelan-Argentinean axis were rife. Pérez Jimenez purportedly aspired to extend to the Amazon while Perón pushed up the “Rio de la
Plata”. The specter of a Bolivar triumphant… haunted Itamaraty. But the worse was yet to come. Suddenly in 1955 the Amazon was out flanked. Both Bolivia and Peru drove roads through the Andes and into the Amazon Basin. (41)

In 1969, the Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera was also said to direct his diplomatic efforts at strengthening the ties among the Spanish-speaking countries that border Brazil in such a way that to some the outline of an anti-Brazilian alliance was in the making. (42) In a “burlesque of Bolivar at Potosi”, Caldera proceeded to pursue the formulation of an Andean anti-Brazilian coalition. (43)

The Andean Group

The creation of the Andean Group may have been the most recent example of a concrete attempt of Spanish-speaking countries to join their efforts in such a way that it produced some reservation on the part of Brazil. The bases of the sub regional agreements were convened in 1967 and the former Latin American Free Trade Association (at present Latin American Integration Association) approved a resolution in the same year to permit the sub regional group to accelerate its process of integration under the Montevideo Treaty. The Group was formally constituted in 1969 by Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Chile. Venezuela joined the organization in 1973 while Chile left it in 1976, because of divergences in terms of economic policy, especially in regard to the regulations for the participation of foreign capitals.

With respect to the goals of the Andean Group, I find it pertinent to quote the following comments by Viron P. Vaky:
While economic integration was the major reason for forming ANCOM, its 'geopolitical' value as a means for dealing with larger power units, such as Brazil or the European Community, was also a real, if unstated, motive. (44)

In fact, the Group was created as a reaction to the supposedly larger benefits that Brazil, Argentina and Mexico were obtaining in terms of trade within the LAFTA. It aimed then at strengthening the economic capacity of the member countries, and, to some extent, their bargaining power in the regional context.

One may ask how such a group represented a regional constraint on the Brazilian sovereignty. This was so because of the interventionist and supranational kind of economic policy defended by the Andean Group, for Brazilian authorities regarded that policy with suspicion, as indicated in Chapter I. (45)

The model espoused by the Andean Group tended to propagandize certain restrictions upon the individual policies and goals of each member of a given integrationist forum, a fact that was apparently regarded with reservation by Brazilian authorities in view of their own economic model and their growing sensibility in terms of a desired autonomy for decision-making.

It should be recognized, however, that this kind of constraint no longer seems to be a major one. (46) Indeed, the more global constraints at the international level (which I will analyze in Chapter III) were said to justify further cooperation between Brazil and the Andean Group, according to the speech made by the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations,
Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, when he signed the Memorandum of Understanding which establishes a permanent mechanism for exchange of information between the two parties. (47) This impression was reinforced by later interviews of President João Batista Figueiredo to the Peruvian newspapers *El Comercio* and *Expreso*, as he considered the perspectives for cooperation in an optimistic way. (48) Georges Landau also believes that “Brazil’s relationship with the Andean Group—...—is now blossoming.” (49)

It has been suggested that the Amazonian Pact would be a proposal intended to weaken the Andean Group. (50) I think, however, that this suggestion is neither consistent with the apparent improvement in the relations between Brazil and the Andean Group nor supported by the differences between the two forums.

The Andean Group is an agreement aimed at deep economic integration and contains a series of articles and regulations concerning industrial programs, tariffs, foreign investments and several other matters related to the main objective of enlarging the Andean markets by means of economic complementation. The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, on the other hand, is a juridical instrument aimed at providing a broad and generic framework of reference for future initiatives of cooperation in the Amazonian area, especially when it comes to an exchange of technical information and expertise. (51) Most of its articles do not address themselves to economic matters. Suffice it to remember that the only article which deals with trade refers to the “retail trade of products for
local consumption among the respective Amazonian border populations.” The Amazonian, Pact is not intended to compete with the Cartagena Agreement or with
any other regional scheme of cooperation. It is rather intended to fill up a vacant area and
to complement the regional efforts which have been made under those other schemes. (52)

The Evolution of Brazilian Bilateral Relations with its Neighbors

In view of the regional constraint, one action adopted by Brazil was its support for
Pan Americanism. In the context of the Pan American conferences, it was possible to
consecrate such principles as peace keeping and nonintervention for which Brazil has been
demonstrating a growing interest, as they represent a juridical safeguard against hostile
purposes. (53) Pan Americanism also led to demonstrations of continental solidarity on the
part of Brazil, a fact that has probably contributed to reduce the ill-feelling about the
country among its Hispanic neighbors and the risk of their joint effort against it. In their
work, Jayme de Barros and Hélio Vianna emphasize the positive effects of this action at
the multilateral level. (54)

Nevertheless, my impression is that the action at the bilateral level has been far more
effective in this sense. Through a persistent effort to establish activities of cooperation with its
neighbors, Brazil has little by little succeeded in demonstrating not only its political goodwill but
also the practical advantages for its neighbors to consider it as a partner rather than as an
adversary. (55) This effort has benefited more recently from the economic improvement
achieved through the last decades by South America in general and Brazil in particular, as both
sides have more to offer to each other.
It can be said that the bilateral relations of Brazil with every South American country have given signs of considerable progress in the more recent decades. Important agreements were signed, and mutual visits of major authorities have become more and more frequent. Even in the case of Argentina, with which longer and more difficult negotiation was necessary in the more recent past to solve the problem of compatibilization between the Brazilian dam of Itaipu and the Argentinian dam of Corpus in the Paraná River, the relationship could hardly be better nowadays, as demonstrated by the visit of President Jorge Videla to Brazil in August 1980 and the visits of President Figueiredo to Argentina in May 1980 and May 1981. Figueiredo’s visit in 1980 has been the first one of a Brazilian President to Argentina in forty-five years.

I will concentrate my attention now in the present bilateral relations of Brazil with its Amazonian neighbors (among the 16,396 km of the Brazilian boundaries with its South American neighbors 12,967 km, i.e., almost eighty percent correspond to the boundaries with Amazonían countries). In the case of Guyana, the relations have improved considerably since the visit of the Chancellor Frederic Wills to Brazil in July 1976. Brazil opened a credit line of 3 million dollars to Guyana in 1977, when the latter was facing difficulties in its external sector. Besides, both countries started to study ways to increase their joint cooperation in the fields of natural resources, transportation and technical assistance. In 1982, the Brazilian Chancellor visited Georgetown, where he signed an Agreement for the Construction of an International Bridge over the Tacutu River, a Basic Agreement
on Scientific and Technological Cooperation as well as a Complementary Act to the latter. In respect to Surinam, Brazil began to approximate to that country even before its independence in 1975, as the Brazilian Chancellor visited Paramaribo in 1971. In 1976, the Prime Minister of Surinam went to Brasília, where a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Trade, as well as a Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation and a Convenium of Cultural Interchange were signed. In 1982, the Brazilian Chancellor visited Paramaribo where he signed a Complementary Act to the Basic Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. It was agreed that the Joint Commission Brazil-Surinam would meet in Brasília the same year to study new activities of cooperation, especially in the formation of human resources, health, agriculture, forestry and mining. With reference to Bolivia, there has been a traditional cooperation in the field of transportation, which has aimed at offering to this centrally-located country an access to the Atlantic Ocean and led to the building of the railways Madeira-Mamoré, Corumbá-Santa Cruz de la Sierra, the highway Guayaramerín-Porto Velho and the installation of bridges or services of boats in the Amazonian rivers of the Brazilian-Bolivian boundary. In 1974, the two neighboring countries signed what should have become their most important agreement, which is popularly known in Brazil as the Acordo do Gás (Gas Agreement) and foresaw regular exports of Bolivian gas in exchange for the installation in Bolivia of a heavy industry pole, to be provided by Brazil. Nevertheless, owing to a series of difficulties, such as their own economic limi-
tations and the need to compatibilize some competitive projects, the agreement has not been implemented yet. In spite of this, Brazil is today the third largest exporter and the sixth largest importer in relation to Bolivia. With respect to Peru, the relations started to improve in 1975, when the Brazilian-Peruvian Joint Commission met in Lima (a meeting in which I had the chance to participate) and negotiated an important and innovative commercial agreement for the exchange of Brazilian corn and soya for Peruvian copper and tin. The agreement is considered to be one of the first to establish the principle of market guarantee. In 1976, the Presidents of Brazil and Peru met at the border and since then, five visits of Chancellors were made and fourteen agreements were signed, among which one that installed a Subcommission for the Amazonian area, another pioneer initiative in the field. In June 1981, President Figueiredo visited Lima, and signed an agreement for highway interconnection, another of cooperation for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and other agreements for the concession of credits for hydroelectric projects and works in Peru. When it comes to Ecuador, up to recent years the cooperation had been practically restricted to a major project in the area of transportation: the building of the Via Interoceanica which was intended to link the Ecuadorian port of San Lorenzo to Manaus in Brazil. Because of petroleum, Brazilian-Ecuadorian trade has grown sharply. In the early seventies, the total bilateral trade oscillated between one and two million dollars. In 1978, only one transaction, signed by the Brazilian trading company
INTERBRÁS, represented 20 million dollars to each partner. A recent major event in the relations between the two countries was the visit of Ecuadorian President Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea to Brazil in February 1982. In the case of Colombia, besides a more traditional convergence of interests in terms of coffee (both countries are large exporters of this product), the economic cooperation has recently gained a new stimulus, thanks to bilateral initiatives in the fields of petroleum and coal. An important commercial agreement was signed between Brazil and Colombia in 1976 in order to enable the former to diversify its sources of supply of coal and the latter to start the exploitation of its reserves. President Figueiredo visited Colombia in September 1981, where he and his Colombian colleague reinforced the recent links between the two countries and reaffirmed their common concern with problems such as the inequalities of the North-South dialogue. Finally, with reference to Venezuela, relations have improved since November 1977, when President Carlos Andrés Pérez became the first Venezuelan Head of State to visit Brazil. As a practical result of this improvement, the biggest public contract of the Venezuelan history (US$ 1,300,000,000,00) was given to a Brazilian-Venezuelan consortium, and the Brazilian imports of oil were increased to 40 thousand barrels per day. In August 1981, the Venezuelan President Herrera Campins retributed the visit of President Figueiredo of November 1979. The two Presidents manifested their mutual support to the respective domestic policies and also reaffirmed their common concern with the North – South dialogue.
and with the international situation. (56)

Although some of the initiatives above may seem modest, they represent a lot of progress in terms of countries with which Brazil did not have anything more meaningful to discuss in the past besides the problems of territorial limits. Indeed, the “distance” that existed between Brazil and those countries contributed to increase the regional constraint, as misperceptions belonging to the colonial times and suspicions raised in the early years of independence tended to last even longer than in the case of the Plata neighbors. In these circumstances, if bilateral relations had not been improved, an initiative such as the Andean Group could have become a real source of political problems.

Final Considerations

Bolivar was surely wrong about the capabilities of the Empire to conduct a successful war against the Spanish-speaking countries. Not only at that time but also throughout its subsequent history, Brazil has practically been a nation lacking military power, as has been well commented by Teixeira Soares, who adds that diplomacy has been the only strength which the country has been relying on. (57)

If the means have been absent, so have the aims, it seems, especially after the first Imperial government more committed to previous Portuguese goals. A considerable number of the Brazilian and foreign authors mentioned before tend to recognize that the country has devoted itself to consolidation rather than expansion
and to defensive rather than aggressive intervention (when it arrived at such an extreme
point). Nevertheless, as it is correctly noted by the Brazilian historian Oliveira Lima, “every
intervention is irritating and capable of endangering international relations.” (58) The
ill-feeling of Hispanic nations in relation to Brazil is symptomatic and the regional hostility that
the Brazilian authorities perceived as a consequence of such feeling has probably harmed a
series of initiatives of cooperation.

A final point should be addressed here and refers to the role played by the recent
improvement in bilateral relations in terms of the signing of the Amazonian Pact. In my view,
the improvement may have contributed to generate some mutual trust at the individual level,
but from a more global point of view, it was an effect and a means rather than a cause. In
terms of the integrity of the Amazonian area of Brazil, the constraint was no longer located at
the regional level, where the weakness of undefined boundaries had been solved and created
no more doubts about the sovereignty of the entity in its subsystem. In such a context, the
establishment of a new agreement of regional cooperation was possible (and facilitated by the
practical benefits generated bilaterally) but not necessary. It was the constraint at the
international level that pushed the initiative as well as the preconditions for it, i.e., the
improvement in bilateral relations. As we shall see in the next chapters, Brazilian
policy-makers have increasingly tended to realize the significance of their international
constraint, a
fact that motivated them to transform the poor framework of regional relationship into a safeguard against the greater challenge.

Notes

(1) An example is Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, ed., Latin American Politics and Development (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979). Nevertheless, the editors limit their approach to the internal “Iberian Characteristics” of each Latin American country and do not account for those countries’ regional relations nor for other external influences that have competed with the Iberian heritage and even become more important than the latter.


(6) Teixeira Soares, Fronteiras do Brasil, p. 97


(27) These conflicting reasons are found in Jayme de Barros, A Política Exterior do Brasil (1930-42) (Rio de Janeiro: Zélio
Valverde, 1943), pp. 159-60; and Vieira de Mello, Vizinhos do Prata, p. 281. Marcos Kaplan states that the absence of Brazil and Argentina was due to British influence, for England feared Bolivar’s policies (Estado Nacional, p. 115).

(28) Tambs, “Amazon Basin”, p. 3.

(29) Vieira de Mello, Vizinhos do Prata, pp. 191 and 121-147.

(30) Quoted in Teixeira Soares, Rio da Prata, p. 58.

(31) José Antônio Soares de Souza, A Missão Bellegarde ao Paraguai (3 vols.; Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1968). This work provides a detailed account of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Brazil and Paraguay, with emphasis upon the mission of the Brazilian Charge d’Affairs Pedro de Alcântara Bellegarde (1849-1852).


(36) These distinct juridical positions reflect the many complex territorial disputes between Portugal and Spain involving their colonies in South America. In a few words, the principle of uti possidetis de facto, defended by the Portuguese, established that the legal boundaries would correspond to the actual situation in the territory under dispute, whereas the uti possidetis de jure, defended by the Spanish, meant that the boundaries would correspond to what they were supposed to be, i.e., according to the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) whose vagueness made it impossible to be implemented.

(37) According to Cassiano Ricardo, Peru thought it had the legal right to Acre (the former Bolivian territory which was bought by Brazil in 1903) and to a large Amazonian area; therefore, the Peruvian government tried to take part in negotiations with Bolivia and Brazil for a triple solution, but Rio Branco did not accept (cited by Delgado de Carvalho, História Diplomática, p. 228, without giving the title of Ricardo’s work).

(38) Teixeira Soares, Fronteiras do Brasil, p. 120.

(39) Barros, Política Exterior, p. 171.


(44) Viron P. Vaky, “Hemispheric Relations: 'Everything is Part of Everything Else'”, Foreign Affairs, LIX, № 3 (1981), 636. On his part, Wayne A. Selcher points out more explicitly that some observers claimed to see in the Andean Group the foundations for a Spanish American grouping directed against Brazil (“Brazil in the World: Multipolarism”, ed. by Elizabeth G. Ferris and Jennie K. Lincoln, p. 83). William P. Avery and James D. Cochrane made the following comment:

“Although it represents a considerably more compact geographically contiguous area than LAFTA, it would be difficult to argue that the andean region constitutes a “natural” or especially 'logical' economic grouping”.

As a consequence, the authors infer the “importance of political motivation” (“Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: the Andean Common Market”, International Organization, XXVII, № 2 (1973), 182-83).

(45) See p. 4 and note 12 to Chapter I (p. 18).

(46) One relevant aspect--reflected in the quotation from Vaky's work on page 40--is that the Andean Group was planned to deal with "large power units" in general. This being the case, Brazil was only one of the targets, which also included Argentina and Mexico, as pointed out by Avery and Cochrane, “Andean Common Market”, p. 183, and by Joseph Grunwald, Miguel S. Wionczek, and Martin Carnoy, Latin American Integration and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972) p. 56.


(48) The interview to Expreso was reproduced in “Figueiredo: 'Abertura é Inabalável'”, O Globo (Rio de Janeiro), Jun. 17, 1981. The interview to El Comercio was reproduced in “Imprensa Deve Refletir e Criar Opinião”, O Estado de São Paulo, Jun. 18, 1981.


(52) In Georges D. Landau, “Amazonia Tomorrow”, Americas (October 1978), p. 17, it is observed that “far from impairing the contents of other integration arrangements such as the Andean Pact, … or the River Plate Basin scheme, the [Amazonia] Treaty aims at complementing them”. Other views on these complementary characteristics are Carlos de Meira Mattos, “A Articulação dos Pactos Andino e Amazônico”, O Estado de São Paulo, May 11, 1980; and “Pactos Andino y Amazónico se Complementan, Ministro Montaño [Ecuadorian Minister of Industry, Trade and Integration]”, El Comercio (Quito), Mar. 16, 1978.

(53) In a conference about the future of Brazil - U.S. relations, Professor Oliveiros S. Ferreira of the University of São Paulo stated that the defense of the principle of nonintervention was “the ostensive reason of being of the [Brazilian] foreign policy which followed the success of conservative nationalism, after 1967”. Quoted in “Professor Explica o que Condiciona as Relações com os EUA”, O Estado de São Paulo, Nov. 20, 1981.


(55) Despite the persistence of suspicions, as reflected by such articles as “Temen Domínio de Brasil dentro del Pacto Amazónico”, Ultimas Noticias (Caracas), Dec. 1, 1977, the image of Brazil as a partner that may collaborate with its neighbors is already acknowledged, as illustrated by Pertinax [pseud.], “Hablemos del Brasil”, Hoy (La Paz), Mar. 9, 1978; Pedro Medina Avendano, “Brasil, Historia del Futuro”, La República (Bogota), Jul. 12, 1978; P. J. Blanco Negrón, “El Pacto Andino y Luis
Herrera”, El Nacional (Caracas), Dec. 30, 1978. Negrón considers very difficult any Latin American unity which does not include Brazil; Ildemaro Briceño, “Por una Mayor Integración con el Brasil”, El Universal (Caracas), Feb. 21, 1981. Briceño affirms that Brazil is destined to be “an ally, an effective partner in the economic and social process” that all Latin American countries should share.

(56) Data was taken from the annual reports of the Brazilian Chancery and from the annual reports of the Brazilian President to the Congress.


(58) Quoted in Mendonça, Historia del Brasil, p. 69.
On the occasion of the Dia do Diplomata (Diplomat's day) in Brazil three years ago, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations stated that the time when the country had only regional perspectives had disappeared. Today, according to the Minister, the increase of trade, the intensification of financing and investment flows and the diversity of the Brazilian political and cultural relations have extended the country's views and interests to every part of the world. As a consequence:

There would be nothing occurring in the international realm that does not interest us (Brazil), that does not affect us or, at least, that does not require our careful attention… We ought to be prepared… to conduct a permanent and simultaneous dialogue, at different levels, with countries in various situations. (1)

The comments above reflect the present relevance for Brazil of the events taking place in its international system. Indeed, the international sphere has become a far more meaningful source of concern than the regional sphere. My task here is then to focus upon problems outside the immediate regional neighborhood. Attention will be given not only to threats to the Amazonian region of the country but also to more general perceived challenges to Brazilian sovereignty and integrity throughout history and particularly to the more recent ones that may have reinforced the need for a regionalization of efforts in order to contain the international constraint.
International Constraints during the Empire

As described in Chapter II, there is no doubt that in spite of other conditioning factors linked to the more global international system (such as the already existing economic dependence from abroad), the main constraints concerning the Brazilian authorities during the Empire originated in Brazil's regional realm. The fact remains that the Empire occasionally faced other challenges to its sovereignty and integrity, particularly from Europe. Besides the opposition of the Holy Alliance to the independence of the new nations in South America, reference should be made to some constraints imposed by England, such as the pressures exerted by that country in order to make the Empire put an end to slavery in Brazil. The British pressure arrived at the extreme point of violating the jurisdiction of Brazil, as England started to capture ships that transported slaves in Brazilian territorial waters. Another serious constraint to Brazilian sovereignty and the integrity of its territory was the dispute with England in regard to the limits between the Amazonian area of Brazil and British Guiana. The dispute, which officially started in 1841 by means of a note of the British Charge d'Affairs to the Brazilian government, only came to an end at the beginning of the Republic, when the question was submitted to the arbitration of the King of Italy, whose decision was unfavorable to Brazil.

A final and more relevant example of international constraint during the Empire came, oddly enough, from the United States, a country that would later become for Brazil a kind of ally against
the regional constraint. As indicated by Teixeira Soares, the diplomacy of the Imperial
government perceived the danger in Caracas, Bogota, Quito, Lima and La Paz, where the
United States sought to obtain the right to navigate the Amazonian rivers. In order to
demonstrate the American interest, the author reproduced a letter of the American Charge
d’Affairs in Bogota, who said he would endeavor to make the Colombian Congress reject a
treaty between Brazil and Colombia, because the treaty acknowledged that the Nation which
possessed the mouth of a river had the right to close it off entirely, a principle that was “very
harmful to the policy of the United States”. (2)

In a more detailed approach to this American interest, Moniz Bandeira has stated
that, under the influence of the expansionist spirit of the “manifest destiny”, the American
Lieutenant Mathew Fontaine Maury began, in the mid 1800s, to diffuse the interest for the
Amazonian region in the press and in some conventions in the United States. Maury wanted
the U.S. to colonize the Northern region of Brazil by transferring part of the American black
population there. His plans apparently counted on the support of the American government, as
the Department of State began to press the Empire to open the Amazon for navigation and
attempted to gain the support of other riverine countries, especially Peru and Bolivia.
According to Moniz Bandeira, the Brazilian authorities were fearful of accepting the U.S.
proposal because they perceived an intention of that country to annex the Amazonian region.
From Peru and Bolivia, the Brazilian envoy Duarte da Ponte Ribeiro warned the Empire of the
danger. The
Imperial representative in Washington, Sérgio Teixeira de Macedo, also thought that the freedom of navigation in the Amazon would lead to the installation of an American establishment and to a large American immigration to the Brazilian area, i.e., “the means by which the encroachment of Texas occurred”. The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Paulino José Soares de Souza considered that the Amazon should be opened for navigation “when it is no longer possible that the guests may become masters”. One of the alleged results of Maury's campaign was the decision of the Empire in 1850 to create a new political administrative entity in the Amazonian area: the province of Amazonas. The American interest in the Amazonian region diminished shortly thereafter as a consequence of the Civil War in that country. On its part, the Brazilian Empire decided to open the Amazon to international navigation on December 7th, 1866.

The Republic: Brazil's International Involvement

During the Brazilian Republic, two factors have played an important role in stimulating the interplay between the regional and the international constraints, as well as in leading the latter little by little to prevail over the former as a conditioning factor in Brazilian foreign policy. The first factor is the solution of the Brazilian boundary problems with its neighbors, thanks mainly to the work of the Baron of Rio Branco, who was the Brazilian Chancellor from 1902 to 1912. The solution of these problems contributed to the reduction of
animosity towards Brazil from Spanish-speaking countries and of the risk of a joint effort on the part of these countries against Brazil. It is symptomatic that the Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945) gave a great deal of importance to the solution of the remaining boundary problems in order to consolidate the Brazilian bilateral relations with its South American neighbors, according to Jayme de Barros. (6)

The second factor is the gradual involvement of Brazil in world affairs, which has tended to diversify the external pressures on the country’s attitude and behavior. The expansion of the Brazilian foreign service and the increased participation of the country in international conferences are quantitative indicators of this involvement, as noted by Bradford Burns. (7) In 1904, Brazil took part in the Montevideo Sanitary Congress; in 1906, in the Genova Conference of the Red Cross, the Brussels Sugar Conference, the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, and the International Conference of Radiotelegraphy in Berlin; in 1907, the Hague Peace Conference; and in 1908, the country was represented in nine international meetings. It could be added that not only were the Brazilians busy attending conferences abroad, but they were the hosts of important ones at home such as the Third Pan American Congress in Rio de Janeiro, in 1906.

In regard to the Brazilian foreign service, besides its expansion in the immediate South American neighborhood, in 1906 Brazil accredited a diplomatic representative to Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama for the
first time. In Mexico also a legation was established in the same year, thereby separating the previously joint Washington-Mexico City diplomatic post. Outside the hemisphere, diplomatic representatives were accredited to Japan (1907), China and Norway (1908), Egypt (1910), Greece (1911) and Turkey (1912). In 1912, Brazil maintained diplomatic representation in thirty-nine countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia and Africa.

However, in spite of this international involvement, Renato de Mendonça considers the Hague Peace Conference, in 1907, as the first important Brazilian participation in world affairs. He quotes the Brazilian historian Heitor Lira, in whose opinion Hague should be considered the starting point of a new policy, as “Brazil came out of its isolation in America to the broader context of international politics”, by means of a dialogue--and sometimes a disagreement--with the main powers of that time. Nevertheless, Mendonça believes that an effective participation in world affairs only started with the election of Brazil for the Council of the League of Nations. (8)

In my view, it is neither essential nor possible to determine with any accuracy the exact moment when the participation of Brazil in the international system became effective. Suffice it to show that the country has tended to become involved in that system and to be more and more influenced. by it.

As indicated before, the regional constraint has contributed, to some extent, in making Brazil sensitive to foreign relationships that could support the country vis-à-vis that constraint. This would be particularly true in the case of
the relationship between Brazil and the United States, for, as indicated by Burns, “closer relations with the United States become one of Rio Branco's ways to offset Brazil’s feelings of solitude or ostracism in South America”.

Brazil demonstrated sympathy not only in relation to Pan Americanism (a safer substitute for Bolivarism, as previously indicated in Chapter II) but also to the Monroe Doctrine (interpreted as a defense of Brazil’s political independence and a protection from European aggression), about which Spanish American nations were far less enthusiastic. Notably during the first years of the Republic in Brazil, an issue which frequently served as a cause for disagreement between the United States and Spanish America tended to be one more bond in bringing together the United States and Brazil. This friendship between the two countries—commonly referred to as an “alliance”—did not, of course, entirely solve the Brazilian problems of security. In respect to Rio Branco, who is considered to be one of the main sponsors of the Brazil-U.S. approximation, Burns observes that

Regardless of how friendly he (Rio Branco) showed himself, he seemed to have a nagging distrust of North American intentions toward the Amazon, one of his touchiest points. As late as 1905, he viewed with suspicion a group of North American tourists ascending the Amazon and he seemed to nourish a certain fear of the United States in that area.

It is interesting to observe that one of the elements of the territorial dispute between Brazil and Bolivia for the present Brazilian state of Acre in the Amazonian area was of an international kind; that is, it went beyond the strict regional character of that dispute. Through the Aramayo Agreement in
1901, Bolivia gave almost sovereign rights to a foreign enterprise to explore and administrate the litigious territory, a fact that increased the apprehension of the Brazilian authorities in view of the possible constitution of an extracontinental enclave in the heart of South America and pressed them to negotiate the purchase of the territory from Bolivia. (12)

Another sign of the Brazilian involvement in world affairs during the Republic and of the constraints that resulted from this involvement is given by the process of industrialization which started in 1930. In Wirth's words, three case studies of this process--foreign trade, steel and petroleum--involved issues in which rather sharp policy alternatives were posed and, at the same time, they dramatized Brazil's international involvement, this maximizing the potential for a nationalist reaction. (13) All three of these cases were touched by Brazil's relations with the outside world and Brazilians were highly aware of that foreign presence during the Vargas years, even if various groups and personalities interpreted its significance differently when responding to the appeals of economic nationalism--“a policy that has as its goal sufficient national economic power to assure the nation's political independence”. (14)

A more comprehensive account of the constraints perceived by the Brazilian authorities is found in Stanley Hilton's work. According to the author, the men responsible for national strategies in the 1930s took little comfort from the Brazil they examined, and a former foreign Minister had put it bluntly: “...Brazil,..., without a navy, without an army, and
divided to the marrow, is worth next to nothing in international life”. The great bulk of the
approximately 35 million inhabitants in 1930 were concentrated in urban clusters along an
irregular coastline, whereas there was less than one inhabitant per square mile in the great
Amazon basin and adjacent areas. Hilton adds that, if the national scene offered small cause
for complacency, the international one presented even less. Indeed,
“a major component of the foreign policy elite’s image of the international environment in the
1930s was that an upheaval of unprecedented proportions was in the making”. The following
passage from Hilton's work serves to illustrate this negative image:

In its annual report…, the General Staff again underscored the fear that the
‘ambitions and claims of Germany, Italy, and Japan, propagandists of a new
division of lands, constitute a latent danger for Brazil.’ Civilian policy makers
fully shared the high command's uneasiness over international developments.
If the subjugation of Ethiopia were allowed, wrote one diplomat in Europe,
'it would be difficult to limit that expansionist tendency, and tomorrow one
might discover that the Amazon is a vast propitious field for Italy to pour her
surplus population into.’ Given these circumstances, the conviction that
industrialization was necessary for national self-preservation gained
increasing support in the ensuing years.(15)

This conviction and the concerns as far as the failure to industrialize are well
reflected in the almost dramatic complaints of Rocha Diniz in 1937. He found it
regrettable that Brazilians did not seem interested in developing the industry and the trade
of their country, as though they did not realize that “the storm was approaching and that
international horizons were darkening”. The author stated that Brazil was at that time—as
in the
past--under the dominance of Anglo-Saxons who tried to obtain all the sources of wealth and production of the country, and perhaps he “direct political control of the Amazonian Valley”, while Brazilians did not seem to be concerned with the increase of manufactured production, i.e., “the true national independence”. (16)

The generalized concern as far as Brazil’s sovereignty, vis-a-vis its international realm, did not arise only from the behavior of certain countries. In 1945, a preliminary plan, which gained UNESCO support, was presented to the Brazilian government. It called for the establishment of an International Institute of the Amazonian Hylaea, which would mobilize international science and technique in order to solve the Amazonian problems. All the Amazonian nations and the three European countries which possessed colonies in South America (England, France and the Netherlands) took part in the Institute. In 1948, a conference was convened at Iquitos in Peru and a convention which called for joint study and development of the basin was signed. Nevertheless, a wave of nationalistic opposition swept across Brazil. When the convention was submitted to the Brazilian Congress, some saw the Institute as a means to internationalize the North of the country, whose sovereignty would be seriously endangered. As a result, the convention was not approved. (17)

Be that as it may, the international constraint had not yet overcome the regional one by that time or, at least, there had been no other secondary conditions to prepare the field for a regional cooperation similar to the Treaty for Amazonian Coop-
eration. Indeed, as indicated by Hilton, Brazilian leaders were also deeply concerned about developments on the South American continent. Territorial disputes between other South American neighbors--Peru - Colombia (1932-33), Bolivia – Paraguay (1932-35), Peru - Ecuador (1941-42)--caused Brazilian policy-makers to feel that Brazil was in danger. In the territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador, the General Staff was so uneasy about the situation, according to the author, that they urged a strengthening of defenses in the Northwest and recommended that plans be formulated to meet a possible attack on Brazil. These facts seem to demonstrate that it was still the South American continent that Brazilian policy-makers regarded as the main arena of the country for vigorous international political activity.

The Military Government of 1964 and Amazonian Integration

The concerns about the question of national integration as well as about Brazilian vulnerability vis-à-vis the international scene seem to have increased considerably during the last two decades. After the Revolution of 1964, in particular, military leaders, always sensitive to strategic and geopolitical security, turned their attention toward the abandoned Amazon. The first Brazilian President, under the new military regime, Castelo Branco, visited Manaus in 1966, declared it a free port and launched the Operação Amazônica (Amazonian Operation) with the aim of accelerating the process of national integration which had a previous important stimulus when the capital was
transferred from Rio de Janeiro, on the coast, to Brasília, a city especially built inland for this purpose.

Referring to the following government of Costa e Silva, who “attached great importance to the development of Brazil’s Amazonian Frontier”, Robert Bond properly notes that this government,

Heavily influenced by a military security doctrine that linked development (defined as rapid industrialization and national integration under technocratic guidance) to national security and to the legitimacy of the military regime, viewed Amazonian development as important for at least three reasons. First, Brazil's rulers wanted to exploit the supposedly vast agricultural and mineral resources contained in the region. Second, the government hoped that Amazonian development might slow the population movement from the impoverished Northeast to the prosperous industrial centers in the South. Third, the Brazilian armed forces believed it essential to develop and maintain a military security presence in this vast, resource-rich but unpopulated territory at a time when world resources and land were being depleted. (19)

This third reason is particularly important, as we shall see in the section about the ecological “crusades”.

As a matter of fact, the analysis made by Bond may be perfectly applied to the other subsequent governments (Emílio Garrastazu Médici, 1969-1974; Ernesto Geisel, 1974-1979; João Batista Figueiredo, 1979–…), as they have taken a series of initiatives to integrate and develop the Amazonian region of the country. I will describe some of these initiatives in Chapter IV, in the context of the national efforts that preceded the “regionalization of efforts”,
as it is called. My aim here is more to point out the overall importance that the military governments have attributed to the question.

In this regard, it is still pertinent to quote the comments of General Jordão Ramos:

The action of the Armed Forces, as can be seen, comprises not only the relevant and decisive role that they play in terms of the defense of the territory and of the formation of human resources to guarantee it but also the ecumenization of the distant and isolated areas on which they are based... so as to assure large political and social impact. The Armed Forces of the Amazonian region are convinced that the development of that area means economic, political and social progress as well as that, while development is achieved, security will also be achieved, for poverty, social unrest and hopelessness pose to the national peace and unity obstacles as serious as any imperialist threat of an ideological, military or economic connotation. (20)

As a consequence, the three branches of the Armed Forces have tried to expand their activities in the Amazon area by building roads, constructing bridges, installing sanitation systems, providing public health centers, establishing communication networks, clearing land for planting teaching agricultural and building techniques, carrying out airfield construction, providing land, riverine and aerial transportation, controlling the sea and the 12,000 miles of navigable rivers, giving medical and social assistance to riverbank dwellers, supporting other government and private organizations and providing services of aerial mapping, search, rescue and mail delivery. (21)

The concerns are not restricted to military sectors, however. A publication of the Ministry of Foreign Relations states:
With regard to the extensive Amazonian frontier, those areas seem to be in a state of economic prostration close to absolute stagnation, and in many places the feeling of distress and hopelessness among the small populations is such that only a passive apathetic fatalism does still link them to their native country. There are even places from which the inhabitants escape in order not to go to other areas in Brazil, but to go instead to neighboring countries, in search of liveable conditions. (22)

Even in a highly critical work about the Transamazônica (Trans Amazon Highway), one of the authors concedes the following:

If the macro-highway is the best way for the occupatia, congratulations to the government. Before knowing the Amazonian region, I thought that the 'gradual foreign occupation' was just talk, but it is the pure truth. One collides with foreigners there. And what would make hundreds of geologists and engineers leave the comfort of the European and American supercities for the heat and the mosquitoes of Acre? We do not have the answer, but we suppose it. If the task is to occupy the Amazonian region, let us work and put the machines in the jungle; let us take back the area. (23)

The Project of the Hudson Institute

During the military government, one of the main perceived attempts of "internationalization" concerning the Amazonian area was the project of the Hudson Institute (a private entity in the United States) to create a system of large lakes in South America. This project, which the former Brazilian Minister of Planning, Roberto de Oliveira Campos, was initially informed about on February 8th, 1967, was formally presented to the Brazilian government one month later and, in the specific case of the Amazonian territory, may be summarized as the building of a dam in the lower Amazon in order to create an enormous lake (600,000 km2 of land would be inundated by the dammed waters) which would improve the
conditions for navigation, for hydroelectric use, and for regional development in the area. Such a plan was inspired by the system of natural lakes in North America and its contribution to the development of the region where those lakes are located.

The project of the Amazonian artificial lake counted on some support in Brazil. The Brazilian engineers Eudes Prado Lopes, who had a similar project of his own, and Felisberto Camargo, who had published a series of studies about the Amazonian area, are considered as principal advocates of the Hudson Institute’s plan, as mentioned during the ordinary session of the House of Representatives on February 12, 1968, when the Federal Representative Bernardo Cabral gave a speech about the lake and the Institute. (24) The Brazilian newspaper Jornal do Brasil also showed sympathy for the project by devoting one of its regular supplements to articles referred to the aims of the artificial lakes in favorable terms. (25)

Nevertheless, the plans also provoked a lot of controversy and many important authorities in Brazil raised doubts about the convenience of the project, as it occurred in that already mentioned session of the House of Representatives. Among the manifestations against the lake, a relevant one was the report written by three Brazilian diplomats and published by the Brazilian newspaper Correio da Manhã on July 14, 1968. (26) The report points out a number of technical problems of the project, such as the need to transfer the population of various towns which would be inundated by the dammed waters and the possibility of unforeseeable climatic changes in the area. It also criticizes the alleged reasons for the dam. In terms of navigation, for instance, it says that the navigable channels of the
lake would be little wider than the previous channels of the rivers. It still denies the Institute’s view that the low lands
of the Amazonian region were inappropriate for agriculture, a view that would justify their inundation.

In spite of all these technical doubts, the basic arguments against the lake were of a political nature. The report stressed that the system of artificial lakes in South America followed a multinational conception that tended to assume supranational traits. The internationalizing characteristics of the project would be demonstrated by the fact that the Institute had not considered the establishment of a North-South line of waterways (through a link between the Paraguay, Guaporé and Madeira Rivers, for instance) which would interest the centrally-located South American nations. According to the report, the omission of this and other points tended to reveal the dispersing sense of the Institute’s plans: instead of aiming at a real integration system, those plans would lead to the reinforcement of the poles of peripheral attraction in the American continent. In other words, the future development of the Amazonian region would follow an external direction, especially towards North America, and would move away from the Brazilian centers or core regions. (27)

Political considerations such as these of the report (which seems to coincide with other disturbing reports about the acquisition of lands by foreigners in the Amazonian region) (28) certainly contributed to characterize the project of the Amazonian lake, in the Brazilian policy-makers’ view, as another internationalizing plan similar to the previously rejected International Institute of Amazonian Hylaea.
Another specific and important constraint on Brazilian sovereignty at the international level was caused by the ecological “crusades” which flourished at the beginning of last decade and have continued until today. Interest in the field of ecology, which is essentially centered in the developed countries, has increased due to the sudden discovery of a possible imbalance between man and earth, as a result of the population explosion and the misuse of existing and newly developed technologies. Some people believe that this possible imbalance could bring about an environmental crisis threatening the future of mankind. The emergence of that interest in ecological problems has not been confined to the realm of the scientific community, for it has also aroused public concern which has expressed itself in such initiatives as the “Earth Week”, celebrated in the United States in April 1970.

As was well noted by the deceased Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador João Augusto de Araújo Castro, there has been a tendency to deal with ecological problems globally, irrespective of the unequal distribution, on a world scale, of the benefits and related destructive effects on the environment as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution. (29) According to the same author, some ecologists did not hesitate even to say that the developing countries could never hope to achieve the consumption patterns of the developed countries, an
affirmation that represented a sensible constraint on countries such as Brazil. The alleged exhaustion of natural resources has been accompanied by forecasts of the fateful coming of ecological hecatombs. The survival of mankind would then require an economic "lebensraum" in the Southern Hemisphere, as developing countries were expected to continue in a state of underdevelopment in order to avoid the evils of industrialization. The global approach to the question of preserving the environment would call for the maintenance of a "green area reserve"—which coincided mainly with the territories of the developing countries—just to provide some sort of counteraction to the spoilage of the same natural elements (soil, atmosphere and water) used up in the countries where the benefits of the Industrial Revolution were massively concentrated. Araújo Castro observes that besides the ostensive imbalance between responsibility for the damage and obligation for repair, that global policy would disregard two distinct forms of pollution, i.e., the "pollution of affluence" and the "pollution of poverty"(30). On his part, Brian Johnson says that "in fact, the environmental problems of poverty may be represented as being more acute and more widespread than the environmental problems of affluence".(31)

Without need to cover these matters further, suffice it to quote the following accurate comments of Wayne Selcher about the Brazilian feelings vis-à-vis the problem:
..., Brazil’s desire to exploit its resources fully and its concerns about international status freezing have led it to endorse an interpretation of sovereignty which necessarily implies full utilization by a state of the resources found within its borders..., unhindered by adverse multilateral arrangements, consultations, or regulations of a suspensive nature. The defensive reactions to foreign criticisms of the ecological and cultural aspects of the opening of the Amazon in the early 1970s were in accordance with this philosophy, as was opposition to Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute’s idea of the mid-1960s to internationalize exploitation of the Amazon through creation of a system of lakes and dams... Similarly, at the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Brazil argued strenuously,..., that international pollution standards applicable to problems found in industrial states with high per capita GNP (the major polluters) would tend to keep the LDCs dependent because of their less sophisticated technologies, especially if international lending agencies were to demand costly environmental standards on projects financed... In its repeated emphasis on national sovereignty as opposed to global action, Brazil refused to have its growth hindered by standards very recently proposed by industrial states which had gained industrial status without the obstacles presented by international regulations.(32)

If the Brazilian authorities feel that any ecological policy, globally applied, must not be an instrument to suppress wholly or in part the legitimate right of any country to decide about its own affairs, it is necessary to note, as Sanders and other scholars do, that Brazil as well as any other country does not want any pollution at all (33) (as we shall see in Chapter IV, the Amazonian Pact pays much tribute to ecological concerns). It is merely felt that each country must responsibly evolve its own development plans and define its own environmental standards.

The ecological “crusades” have then represented an important form of constraint. Indeed, if I were to choose a symbolic turning point for the predominance of the international constraint over the regional one, I would choose the “crusades”, not only because of their
more immediate proximity in time to the proposal of the Amazonian Pact (which began being studied in the mid-1970s) but also and, more importantly, because of their global impact. Whereas other manifestations of the international constraint came under a single entity or group of entities
(basically the main powers) of the international system, the “appeal” of the ecological “crusades” could combine many more entities in a common front against the Brazilian goal of full sovereignty. (34) This point is perceived by General Jordão Ramos, when he says that Brazil should urgently ecumenize its inland, whose unexplored natural resources and inhabited areas tended to attract the attention of both undeveloped and overindustrialized countries, such as Japan and other Asiatic nations, or African countries. (35) General Meira Mattos also considers it a dangerous challenge to keep that demographic vacuum (1.6 inhabitant per km²) in an area of continental dimensions, “while the serious problem of overpopulation in regions such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and China is becoming a source of international concern”. (36)

The ecological challenge is then of a general and recurrent nature at the same time, as it appears everywhere and practically all the time. An important aspect is that the challenge is not restricted to individual countries. Indeed, international organizations tend to give a great deal of support to campaigns in favor of the supranational protection of the environment. In 1980, e.g., a “World Conservation Strategy” was launched simultaneously in various countries and international forums and counted on wide press coverage (I had the opportunity to assist its launching in the Main Building of the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.). Among the various points of the main document, which describes that strategy, one refers specifically to tropical forests. (37)
Brazil's Growing World Involvement in More Recent Years

So far, I have emphasized the constraints on the Brazilian sovereignty concerning the Amazonian region in particular. It would be worthwhile to focus now upon more general constraints which have occurred recently and tended to reinforce the specific concern of the country for its Amazonian region. These constraints seem to have increased in proportion to the country's continuous and growing involvement in its international realm in recent years.

The expansion of the Brazilian foreign service, initiated in the first years of the Republic (38) has accelerated through the last decades. Selcher shows, for instance, that between 1964 and 1976, Brazil expanded its non-consular diplomatic staff and support personnel abroad in bilateral and multilateral posts from 1088 to 1533, a growth of 52.1 percent. While the political representation in foreign capitals grew by 50.4 percent, which in IGOS jumped 70.2 percent. (39) According to data of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of Brazil, 54 new foreign offices have been created from 1975 to 1980. This represented an increase of 35.75 percent over the previous structure. These numbers are specially meaningful if one takes into account the economic and financial shortbacks faced by the country, notably as a result of the increase in oil prices, for Brazil is heavily dependent on foreign oil.

The main general constraints have occurred on both economic and political grounds. From the economic point of view, the constraint is represented by the number of difficulties
has been facing in its relationship with the so-called first World. Already in the 1930s, “some prominent Brazilians began to realize that neo-colonial status was no longer feasible”, which led to a continuous effort so that “Brazil would become an independent industrial nation”. (40) An initial economic policy of import substitution industrialization was later replaced by an emphasis on the rationalization of the economy, which included more outward-oriented, foreign economic policies from 1964 to 1974. (41) From 1968 to 1974, Brazil attained considerable economic growth and tended to give growing importance to its internal need for development. Whereas the progress attained then certainly contributed to increasing the country’s self-confidence in relation to the challenges of its regional realm, it has led to growing concerns about the disputes in the more global realm. In the case of the United States, for instance, Albert Fishlow correctly notes that the Brazilian “economic miracle” of that period has progressively eroded the “alliance” with the United States instead of ratifying it. (42) Indeed, Brazil has been worried with the imbalance between its need for external cooperation and some answers it received from the First World, especially after 1974, when the Brazilian economy began to face more and more difficulties. The continuous growth of Brazilian exports, a fundamental necessity to sustain the economic development of the country, has been threatened by increasing commercial protectionism in its main markets of Europe and the United States. Initiatives such as the Tokio Round were simply frustrating in terms of liberalization of trade, as the Brazilian authorities
complained on many occasions after those negotiations. (43) Besides, the country has faced more recently a highly discriminatory financing and trading policy applied by developed countries, under the label of “graduation”. This policy means that the supposedly “advanced developing nations”, due to their economic “graduation”, lose the right to exporting several products to developed countries under the General System of Preferences (GSP) as well as to obtaining loans at low interest rates from international financing institutions. The implementation of projects of social development in Brazil has been put in jeopardy as a result of that policy, for these projects depend heavily on public financing. (44) In my view, these constraints on the economic sphere have led Brazil to adhere to some extent to such common claims of the Third World as collective economic security and the New International Economic Order (NIEO). (45)

On political grounds, among the various constraints, two deserve special attention. The first refers to the difficulties imposed to the Brazilian nuclear policy. The Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has represented a challenge to that policy and Brazil's official opposition to it has always hinged on the inequity of the instrument and lack of provisions to make certain that the nuclear powers fulfill their promises of corresponding commitments in the area of arms control, an end to nuclear weapons tests, greater aid in peaceful energy, and protection of states not possessing nuclear weapons from nuclear threat or attack. Without such provisions, it was Brazil's belief that the NPT would be merely a unilateral restraint for
the nonnuclear signatories, one of the most blatant of the superpower attempts to freeze the international hierarchy. (46) Another blow to Brazil’s nuclear policy came in 1974, when the U.S. Government informed that it could no longer guarantee the processing of nuclear fuel for Brazilian reactors then under construction by Westinghouse. (47) That blow influenced the Brazilian decision, one year later, to sign an agreement for the purchase from West Germany of full nuclear fuel cycle technology and facilities, including up to eight reactors, a uranium enrichment plant, and a spent fuel reprocessing facility. Although the entire deal was placed under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), much opposition, mainly from the United States, has been made to the Brazilian nuclear agreement, thus creating a delicate political situation for Brazil as well as much resentment.

The second constraint refers to the question of human rights, which the Brazilian military regime was frequently accused of violating. The pro-human rights “crusades” were stimulated by the position followed by the American Administration of Jimmy Carter, a position that was taken by the Brazilian authorities as an external interference in their domestic affairs or, in Fishlow’s words, a “provocation”. (48) A typical example of the negative reaction of Brazil to that position was given by the U. S. congressional requirement of a report on human rights as a condition to authorize military aid to a certain country. In view of this requirement, Brazil rejected any further military assistance from the U.S. in the Spring of 1977 and, some months
later, canceled long-standing bilateral military pacts between the two countries.

Final Considerations

Talking about the fragility of Brazilian physical integration, Meira Mattos mentions two historical episodes which illustrate to some extent the importance of the regional constraint and the increasing presence of the international one in Brazil’s life. (49) One episode was the War of the Triple Alliance (Brazil-Argentina-Uruguay) against Paraguay, when the country dramatically felt the problem of its poor internal communication, as it saw itself unable to send the military troops needed to contain the foreign invasion of the Brazilian territory of Mato Grosso. The other episode was World War II, when the blockade imposed by German submarines practically immobilized the country, which depended heavily on sea transportation to link its Northern and Southern areas. As can be seen, the main threat in the second episode came significantly from outside the immediate neighborhood of Brazil.

In fact, the constraints have tended to derive more and more from the international system rather than from the regional subsystem and to forge “a working relationship with Spanish America for the defense of collective economic interests”. (50) Of course, this relationship did not aim only at the defense of economic interests, even if these interests are especially relevant for countries who share the common vulnerability of underdevelopment. Besides, that kind of compensatory relation-
ship is being forged also with other entities of the international system such as the African ones. It seems to me that by approaching other entities outside its regional subsystem, Brazil may try to avoid such a spread of the international constraint, as the ecological “crusades” were tending to provoke. The political character of the compensatory relationship should also be stressed, as it would be absurd to expect that underdeveloped countries could be an alternative to the economic difficulties imposed by the First World.

It should be clarified, above all, that Brazil's search for closer ties with its regional neighborhood and with other countries because of external threats is of a defensive rather than of an aggressive nature. In other words, Brazil does not show an inclination to respond to a threat with a measure which may be interpreted as another threat and thus worsen a given situation. A good example of this is provided by the almost reluctant official position, in regard to the association formation among exporters of raw materials. If it is true that Brazil does not blame the policies of OPEC because of a Third World solidarity, it is no less true that Brazil does not look for the formation of cartels of products which it exports. The defensive working relationship caused by Brazil's international constraint is well reflected by the proposal of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation and is in harmony with the tradition of the country to follow moderate policies, as recognized by authors like Roett and Selcher.

(51) In this sense it is symptomatic that the Brazilian Chancellor Saraiva Guerreiro considered that
the spirit of the meeting between 22 Heads of State of developed and developing countries, held in Cancun from October 22-23, 1981, should be that of nonconfrontation. (52)

Notes


(5) According to Dozer, Brazil did not make this decision “until 1866, when U.S. policy towards Latin America was not longer made by slavery advocates, avid for territorial expansion, and when a liberal government assumed power in Rio”. (Donald Marquand Dozer, América Latina - Uma Perspectiva Histórica, trans. into Portuguese by Leonel Vallandro (2nd ed.; Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1974), p. 317).


(9) Burns, Unwritten Alliance, p. 170.


(11) Burns, Unwritten Alliance, pp. 178-179.


(24) The debates of the ordinary session of the House of Representatives were reproduced in *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, XI, Nº. 41/42 (1968), 149-65.

(26) “A Verdade sobre o Instituto Hudson”, Correio da Manhã (Rio de Janeiro), Jul. 14, 1968. The newspaper does not provide the names of the authors.

(27) This result is also emphasized in a more recent article, which affirmed that the true aim of the Hudson Institute consisted of liking the Amazonian countries “to the strategic interests of defense and security of the United States from both the geopolitical and economic points of view”. According to the same article, such a link would restrain the sovereignty and the independence of those countries (Maerle Ferreira Lima, “Amazônia - Dos Grandes Lagos aos Grandes Projetos Madeireiros”, Correio Braziliense (Brasília), Mar. 4, 1979).

(28) The report of a Committee of the House of Representatives, on June 3, 1968, informed that the acquisition of lands was a cause of concern, as the location of these lands gave the impression of a “string” which isolated the Amazonian region from the rest of the country (in Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, XI, Nº 41-42 (1968), 115-38).


(30) Ibid, pp. 409 and 411.


(33) Thomas G. Sanders, “Development and Environment: Brazil and the Stockholm Conference”, American University Field Staff, East Coast South America Series, XVII, Nº 7 (1973). In an interview published in “Indians and Brazil's Miracle”, Multinational Monitor, lst ed., Winter 1978-79, anthropologist Shelton Davis says that the considerable attendance he saw at a conference on Indian policy in Brazil demonstrated the “tremendous concern on the part of the Brazilians about what is happening to the Indians and to the environment”. The growing concern with environmental problems in Brazil is also reflected by such articles as “SEMA (Special Secretary for Environment) Critica Desmatamento da Amazônia”, Jornal de Brasília, Dec. 12, 1978; “Amazônia: 65% da Floresta Poderão ser Preservados”, O Estado de São Paulo, Sep. 23, 1979; and “Brazil Expands Parks to Protect its Wildlife”, The Standard Speaker (Hazleton, U.S.A.), May 7, 1982.

(35) Jordão Ramos, “Integração da Amazônia”, p. 83. The same point is stressed on pages 105-06 of the special study of the “Escola Superior de Guerra” (n. 20 supra). Another reference to the problem is found in Ferreira Reis, Cobiça Internacional, p. 59.


(37) See point 16 of the main document World Conservation Strategy, prepared by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), with the advice of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF).

(38) See pp. 59-60 supra.

(39) Selcher, Multilateral Relations, p. 55.

(40) Wirth, Brazilian Development, pp. 1-4.


(44) This problem was given emphasis by the Brazilian Chancellor in an interview to the Argentinian newspaper Clarin, on Oct. 25, 1981, as reproduced in the Daily Report (on Latin America) of October 29, 1981 of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) of the U.S. Government, p. D1.
(45) See, e.g., the speeches made by the Brazilian Chancellors before the XXVII and XXXI General Assemblies of the United Nations in 1972 and 1976.

(46) Selcher, Multilateral Relations, pp. 77-78.

(47) Fishlow, “U.S. - Brazil Relations”, p. 397.


(49) Meira Mattos, Geopolítica Pan-Amazônica, pp. 148-49.

(50) Riordan Roett, “Brazil Ascendant: International Relations and Geopolitics in the Late Twentieth Century”, Journal - of International Affairs, XXIX, No 2 (1975), 139-54. According to Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power (Boulder: Westview Press, 1976), p. 36, Brazilian. Policy-makers believe that “allying with less-developed countries on basic international economic questions is the only effective way to exert leverage upon the industrial powers”. In fact, in his speech on Oct. 30, 1980, during the Seminar on Latin America Integration, sponsored by the House of Representatives of Brazil, the Brazilian Chancellor suggested that Latin American unity would facilitate the dialogue with other regions as well as the attainment of historical claims such as the NIEO.


(52) According to an interview reproduced in the Daily Report (on Latin America) of October 6, 1981 of the FBIS, p. DI. Another example of this moderation is provided by the speech of the Brazilian Chancellor before the XXXVI General Assembly of the United Nations in 1981 (mimeographed copy).
CHAPTER IV

THE TREATY FOR AMAZONIAN COOPERATION

Thus far, I have described the two main constraints with which Brazilian policy-makers have had to deal with since Brazil's independence. I now intend to focus on the Brazilian attitudes and expectations in regard to the Amazonian region of the country and to the Treaty that was created as a possible means of stimulating the development of that region and, above all, of assuring Brazilian control over such a process of development.

I will begin by analysing the contents of the Treaty itself (1) in search of elements that reinforce the main theoretical proposition of the preceding chapters. By containing a series of safeguards, the Treaty reflects important Brazilian concerns with such problems as territorial integrity, national sovereignty and development. Speeches and conferences about the Treaty will be mentioned in order to further demonstrate its primary intentions.

I will go on to examine some previous efforts made by the Brazilian government to integrate and develop the Amazonian region, the authorities' attitude towards multinational corporations in the light of the basic concern of assuring the country's sovereignty over its natural resources, and the results of the First Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Amazonian countries (held in Belém in October 1980) as reflected by the Declaration of Belém. I will end up by speculating on the advantages and prospects of the Brazilian initiative.
The Contents of the Treaty

Endowed with “the juridical characteristics of a traité-cadre, an 'umbrella agreement' which for its full implementation requires the conclusion of complementary and specific understandings and agreements” (2), the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation certainly appears to be a very diversified text which contains not only a considerable number of areas of possible joint cooperation but also some broad conceptual assumptions and operational schemes.

The first example of such diversification and broadness is given by the seven considerations which refer to the possible joint cooperation in fields such as the development of the Amazonian area, regional integration, economic growth, and environmental conservation. Some conceptual assumptions which are emphasized by those considerations consist of the usefulness of sharing national experiences in matters pertaining to the promotion of regional development, the need for a balance between economic growth and conservation of the environment and the convenience of raising the standard of living of the peoples in the area. As to the operative schemes the considerations make a subtle suggestion about the schemes already adopted by the Parties by means of a general reference to “the common aim of pooling the efforts being made, both within their respective territories as well as among themselves”. Bearing in mind that considerations normally
consist of a set of conventional elements that precede the more substantive articles, those of the Amazonian Pact certainly provide a very comprehensive introduction
to the Treaty.

In spite of this comprehensiveness, I think that the seven considerations tend to emphasize the basic concern of the Brazilian authorities as to the sovereignty and the integrity of their country. In fact, the references to both goals seem not only frequent but also stronger and more explicit than the references made to other goals. The very first consideration begins by stressing that the eight countries are aware of the importance of their respective Amazonian regions to each one, “as an integral part of their respective territories”. The second consideration, which is generally devoted to socio-economic aspects, also stresses the political concern to achieve total incorporation of the Amazonian territories into their respective national economies. Finally, the fifth consideration explicitly affirms that both socio-economic development and conservation of the environment are responsibilities inherent in the sovereignty of each State, and that cooperation among the Contracting Parties shall facilitate fulfillment of these responsibilities. While the demands for economic growth and development (another major goal of Brazil) are often moderated or balanced by references to social aims or conservational aspects, the same does not apply to the demands for sovereignty and integrity. Besides, as indicated more clearly by the fifth consideration, the main activities to be stimulated by the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation should be at the service of an increasing sovereign control of each country over its Amazonian region.
In regard to the articles, they cover—of course in greater detail—from mere declaratory principles to an extensive list of fields for joint cooperation and respective schemes of implementation.

As to these fields, the Treaty provides for the protection and rational utilization of natural resources (Article I), the free navigation of the rivers of the Amazonian region (Article III), the rational use of hydro resources (Article V), the promotion of joint research and exchange of information on the flora and fauna (Article VII), the adoption of measures to improve health conditions in the region (Article VIII), the promotion of scientific and technological research (Article IX), the development of transportation and communications infrastructure (Article X), the retail trade for local consumption among the border populations (Article XII), the promotion of tourism (Article XIII), and the cooperation in ethnological and archeological matters (Article XIV).

In relation to the operational schemes, Article II foresees occasional meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Contracting Parties, aimed at establishing the basic guidelines for common policies and to assess the general development of the process of Amazonian cooperation. Article XXI creates the Amazonian Cooperation Council, formed by diplomatic representatives, who should meet on a regular basis, once a year. The following articles refer to the functions of the Secretariat of that Council, to the creation of Permanent National Commissions in each country and to other administrative and operational matters.
The Treaty as a whole covers then a wide range of topics. Notwithstanding, the political aspects still seem to me the more remarkable trait of the Treaty. As to its operational schemes, the two main bodies of decision--the meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Amazonian Cooperation Council--are composed of diplomatic representatives. This composition, in my view, would tend to indicate that, in accordance with the special nature of the Treaty, political considerations should prevail over technical ones. As to the conceptual level, i.e., the contents of a declaratory kind, the political concerns with sovereignty and integrity are at least as visible as they appeared to be in the considerations. Article IV explicitly declares that the exclusive use and utilization of natural resources within the respective territory is a right inherent in the sovereignty of each state and should not be subject to any restrictions other than those arising from international law. Article X considers a “priority goal” the full incorporation of the Amazonian territories into their respective national economies. Articles XI and XIII, which respectively refer to human and natural resources and to tourism, make it clear that the regional cooperation should not be detrimental to national policies and measures. In fact, this cooperation is expected to reinforce the action envisaged in the national plans of each state, according to Article XI. The concerns with national sovereignty are still reflected by two other articles. Article XVI generalizes that the decisions and commitments adopted by the Contracting Parties under the Treaty ought not to be to
the detriment of projects and undertakings executed within the territory of one Party. Article XVIII
states that the contents of the Treaty do not “in any way” limit the rights of the Contracting Parties to
conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on specific matters concerning their Amazonian
territories.

Taking the contents of the Treaty into account, I find very pertinent the following comments
made by Rubens Ricúpero:

From the 28 Articles of the Treaty one can infer its five fundamental principles:
1. the exclusive competence of the countries of the region in terms of the
development and protection of the Amazonian area;
2. the national sovereignty in terms of the consequent absolute priority of the
internal efforts towards the development of the Amazonian territories of each
state;
3. the regional cooperation as a means to facilitate the achievement of the first two
goals;
4. the balance and the harmony between development and ecological conservation;
5. the absolute equality among all the Parties.

With reference to the principles one, two and three, which are closely interrelated, Ricúpero
goes on to note that there would be no attitude more correct than to attribute to the Amazonian
nations the exclusive responsibility for the destination of the area. Because the Amazonian territory
is populated by a very low number of inhabitants (only 4 percent of the entire population of the
country in an area that corresponds to some 42 percent of the Brazilian territory), the Brazilian
diplomat believes that is essential to avoid plans of foreign interference, such as the former Pacto da
Hikéia or the Projeto dos Lagos (3), which could be provoked by the demographical vacuum (4).

The means chosen by Brazilian authorities to avoid those
plans was the “regionalization” of the efforts to occupy and develop the Amazonian area and integrate its various portions to their respective national entities. As recognized by Ostrander, the Pact is, in effect, an endorsement of the philosophy of “Amazonia for the Amazonians”.(5) When the Treaty was signed, the former President of Brazil, Ernesto Geisel, stated the following in his speech to the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the Member Countries:

The best antidote against the attempts of internationalization, whether under the ostensive forms of the past or whether under the more subtle forms of the present, is the regionalization of the protection of the area. In the Amazon region, I repeat, the countries which divide that territory among themselves-- and no one else--han the exclusive responsibility for its development (6).

The former Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil, Antônio Azeredo da Silveira, emphasized the same point by saying:

As a matter of fact, the Treaty definitively consecrates the exclusive responsibility of the nations of the area in terms of development and conservation of the Amazonian region, by preventing, by means of the regional collaboration, the failures and omissions that up to recently have made possible some sporadic attempts of internationalization and interference. (7)

In his speech, Geisel also properly notes that besides preventing undesired attempts in relation to the area, the Treaty has the virtue of objectiveness. According to him, the correct means to integrate the Treaty is the condition of “Amazonian” and this condition can not be freely attributed or refused by anyone because “it comes from a fact: the sovereign existence within the Amazonian region”. (8)

At this point, I think it appropriate to mention Article II
of the Treaty. It establishes that the Treaty will be in force in the territories of the Contracting Parties in the Amazon Basin as well as in any territory of a Contracting Party which, by virtue of its geographical, ecological or economic characteristics is considered closely connected to that Basin. In view of such objective criteria, one country can not claim the right to concede or to deny to another country the Amazonian condition, for such a condition is a geographical fact. In order to further prevent any intention towards the Amazonian region by a country which does not geographically belong to it, the reference made by Geisel to “the sovereign existence within the Amazonian region” was apparently addressed to French Guiana. It should be also noted that while restricting the Amazonian condition to a certain group of countries, the geographical criterion proposed by the Brazilian authorities prevents further restrictions (as the ones presented by a merely riverine criterion) that could hamper the implementation of the Treaty, by possibly involving controversies such as the territorial one between Peru and Ecuador (9).

The former President makes another important observation in his speech when he says that the Treaty gives value not only to regional sovereignty but also to national sovereignty, which constitutes the primary source of the former (10). Articles XI and XIII clearly illustrate this point, as they safeguard the national plans of the countries in terms of such specific matters as human and natural resources and tourism. The same safeguard is also established by Article XVI, but in broader terms, as the
article generically refers to all kind of decisions and commitments adopted by the Contracting Parties.

Indeed, the question of sovereignty may be divided, as proposed by Ricúpero, into three distinct dimensions: the national, the bilateral and the regional ones. Within the national sphere, the internal problems of occupation and development will continue to be dealt with by competent national authorities, without any interference on the part of other countries, even including members of the Treaty. The bilateral dimension recognizes the possibility of specific matters which are of the exclusive interest of two countries, while the regional dimension comprises all those matters which would involve the interest of a larger number of member countries, if not all. One such case, which preceded the Treaty, is the Apa do Rio Branco, signed in the Brazilian Northern city of Rio Branco on January 29, 1969 by the Ministers of Transportation of Brazil, Bolivia and Peru, in order to reaffirm their governments’ interests for some interconnections among their respective highway systems along their borders. Another example is provided by the Intergovernmental Technical Committee for the Protection of the Amazonian Fauna and Flora, which was made up of Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela in 1975 in an attempt to achieve more complete and efficient ecological protection and the suppression of illegal activities in the Amazonian region. As suggested by Ricúpero, the solution to some problems often depends on a larger collaboration among countries (11).
These distinct dimensions reveal the special effort of the Brazilian authorities to avoid the predominance of multinational criteria over national ones. In fact, they understand that “the internal problems of occupation and development of natural resources will continue to be decided at the national level”. Each government remains responsible for the definition and choice of techniques for agricultural and forestal exploitation, for the approval of projects conducted by private entrepreneurs and so on.

The fourth fundamental principle one can infer from the articles of the Treaty would be the balance and harmony between the economic development and the ecological protection. According to Ricupero, one of the modern characteristics of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation consists of the awareness shown by its negotiations vis-à-vis an important idea of the more recent decades, such as the need to analyse and evaluate the impact of ecological problems. The Brazilian diplomat even ventures to say that there would possibly be no other comparable regional treaty that has attributed such a harmonious balance to the needs for development and for ecological conservation. (13) Robert Bond also finds that one of the main significances of the Amazonian Pact lies in the decision of the Contracting Parties to pay more attention than in the past to the ecological dangers inherent in the unbridled exploitation of the Amazonian region. (14)

I interpret the emphasis on ecological aspects as both a concession and a preventive move on the part of Brazilian policy-makers. At the same time that they make a concession to
the campaigns in favor of ecological conservation, Brazilian authorities reveal their own concern with the problem in an attempt to reduce the risk of a more intense interference in their domestic plans of development on the part of the conservationist lobby.

The following passages of a conference made by the Brazilian diplomat Luiz Orlando C. Gélio clearly illustrate the awareness of the ecological problem:

1) The Amazonian region does not appear to be, first of all, the granary of the humanity anticipated by some people nor the reserve to be used in the future so as to reduce the lack of food in an overpopulated world. Its soil--and this fact was painfully learned--is generally poor and the indiscriminate felling of the forest, aimed at an agriculture of large scale, would not only have frustrating economic results, owing to the present technical stage, but could also cause harmful effects to the ecological balance, …;
2) As a consequence of the previous observation, it is not probable either that the Amazonian region may become the ideal landscape for a massive industrialization.

On the other hand, Gélio affirms that it is not logical to regard the region as an ecological sanctuary, as an untouchable reserve of oxygen that developed nations want to preserve as a guarantee of their own future well being, after having polluted their rivers, their lakes and their atmosphere in order to achieve the progress from which they benefit at present.(15)

Thus, ecological conservation should not be an isolated goal, a view expressed as follows in the speech made by the former President of Brazil, Ernesto Geisel, when the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation was signed in Brasília:

Directed towards the dispute for the land in the past, the plans of interference may assume today the more
subtle forms of well intentioned concerns. Based on arguments without scientific foundation, many absurd dangers are alleged in order to cast doubts upon the capacity or the determination of the national governments. One speaks in the name of an international solidarity that is nevertheless refused when the case is the struggle for development. Without ignoring the importance and the seriousness of the ecological problems nor doubting the sincerity and good faith of many of their lobbyists, I permit myself to affirm that nobody other than us [the national governments] is entitled or motivated to zeal for a balance upon which our own future depends greatly. The exclusive responsibility of all of us in the Amazonian region is complemented by a duty that can not be eluded. Unless they want to frustrate the achievement of their own potential, the countries of that region can not turn their heads against the Amazonian challenge and condemn South American to be forever a periphery without a center, a fringe of people alongside the oceans and valleys, without lines of communication that give life to the empty heart of the continent. The solution to these problems is not given by an absenteeist quietness nor by the renunciation to progress. It is by means of a persisting and rational action, disposed to reconsider methods whenever reality so recommends it, that we will solve our problems. The Brazilian diplomacy has always stressed that the concern with the Amazonian habitat only makes sense in relation to the human beings who live there; moreover, the worst form of pollution is poverty and underdevelopment. Inspired by such principles, we will know how to continue with firmness and balance in our effort to give value, in benefit of their people, to the Amazonian region, which many would like to see stagnate. (16)

The fifth main principle that may be inferred from the Amazonian Pact relates to the absolute equality among all the Contracting Parties. This principle is practically expressed by the rule of the unanimity of decisions found in Article XXV, according to which decisions at the meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of the Amazonian Cooperation Council and of any special Commissions that the Contracting Parties esteem necessary to establish to study specific matters shall always require the unanimous vote of the Member Countries, in the first two
cases and of the participating countries in the third case.

With respect to this principle, the former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations expressed the following comments when the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation was signed:

In accordance with the principle that it has been observing vis-à-vis its bilateral relations and the regional forums in which it takes part, Brazil is convinced that only a system of cooperation that offers to everyone and to each one of its participating parties a clear mutuality of benefits and adequate advantages will be able to attain solidity and durability in the long run. The guarantee that it is possible to structure such a system, …, is found in the rule of consensus, which shall constitute the characteristic sign of initiatives. Born from the free agreement of countries which are aware of their individuality, the Treaty will work on the basis of the unanimous decision of its members, a fact that eliminates, from the beginning, any possibility of hegemonies or confrontations between majorities and minorities.(17)

Similar interpretations are found in the press coverage of the Treaty.(18)

Besides Article XXV, other articles have also inspired foreign authorities and analysts to dismiss the hypothesis of eventual hegemonies and stress the notion of equality within the Treaty. In an interview published by the newspaper A Folha de São Paulo, for instance, the former Chancellor of Venezuela stressed that all the parties would equally benefit from the Treaty.(19) In another interview, published by O Estado de São Paulo, the former Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations not only affirmed in general that the Treaty would favor the harmonious development of the Amazonian region and avoid imbalances in the area but also denied more specifically that it might favor Brazil or be detrimental to Peruvian interests.(20) Both
declarations are certainly based upon Article I of the Treaty. In an apparent reference to Article XVIII, an article published by the Peruvian newspaper Correo commented that the priority attributed by the Contracting Parties to projects belonging to less developed countries would eliminate the eventual problem of a “dangerous hegemony”.

Finally, Landau noted that the flexible operational schemes established by the Treaty would reflect one of its fundamental principles: to avoid the predominance of any country over the others, a situation that could be involuntarily provoked by the installation of a permanent secretariat in a given country.

The Regionalization of Efforts

As considerable importance has been attributed by the Brazilian authorities to the regionalization of the efforts to integrate and develop the Amazonian region, attention ought to be given here to the success and the limitations of the national efforts of Brazil to accomplish this task.

The interest of the Brazilian government for its Northern region is, of course, an old one. An example was the decision of the Imperial government to decree the establishment of the Province of Amazonas with the city of Manaus as its capital on September 5th, 1850, when ambitious colonization projects were simultaneously launched. In 1867, the Empire opened the Amazon to international traffic and the Baron of Mauá (an important Brazilian industrialist) established the Amazon Steam Navigation Company, which provided the region with a reasonable flux of transportation.
Nevertheless, as well observed by Arthur César Ferreira Reis, the Amazonian region was not (and could not yet be indeed) a higher priority for the Imperial policy-makers. The famous “economic boom” of the region at that time—the so-called rubber rush—was, according to the author, promoted without official coordination, without method nor discipline, on the basis of pure adventure. The government was virtually absent as a coordinating force or political guarantor in such episodes as the assault on the forest, the manipulation of financial resources, the provision of labor and food to the established seringais (scattered rubber plantations), and the installation of thousands of immigrants from the Brazilian Northeast. On his part, Gélio notes that while the “boom” contributed to the dynamism of the urban centers of Belém and Manaus, the disorganized installation of those immigrants and the forms of agriculture they practiced produced serious damages to the soil in certain geographical areas, as is the case of the one between the cities of Belém and Bragança. The beginning of planned British exploitation of rubber in Sri-Lanka and Singapore put an earlier end to the Amazonian “boom”. In 1900, those areas already provided 4 tons of rubber to the international market, and in 1914, their production reached 71,400 tons in comparison with only 33,591 tons of the Amazonian rubber.

Other attempts which counted on a variable degree of governmental support have also failed. In 1928 Henry Ford received some lands in the Tapajós valley and tried to develop rubber plantations similar to the successful British ones
After some years of efforts, both concessions--Fordlândia and Belterra--were returned to the Federal government, as plagues and the hardening of the soil prevented them from obtaining the same positive results as their British counterparts.

In 1940, the former President Getúlio Vargas visited Manaus, and in one of his speeches called for the integration of the basin into the nation and proclaimed that the region was the land of the future. Some isolated steps have been taken to implement his will. In 1943, three new Federal territories were established by decree: Guaporé (now known as Rondônia), Rio Branco (now known as Roraima) and Amapá. The former Banco da Amazônia (Bank of Amazonia) has been transformed into Banco de Crédito da Amazônia and began to operate in new areas such as the financing of regional industrialization and production. By that time also, a conference among all the South American nations with Amazonian territories was planned, but has not been carried out. In 1945, the Brazilian government was presented the plan for the establishment of an International Institute of the Amazonian Hylaea, which gained UNESCO support and created more problems than solutions, as indicated in Chapter III.(26) In 1946, the new Brazilian constitution allotted three percent of all federal revenues to Amazonian development and, later, a new organ--the Superintendency of the Plan to Valorize the Economy of Amazonia (SPVEA), established in 1953--was placed in charge of the planning for the investment of those resources.(27)

Nonetheless, as asserted by Ricúpero and Tambs, the inauguration of Brasília, the new Brazilian capital, was the
most important official step towards a more continuous and efficient policy of integration and development of the Amazonian region.(28) Tambs comments that whereas the SPVEA had been a mixed success, Brazil needed more than plans and projects. This being the case, “the answer was Brasília”. Ricúpero suggests that after the false rubber “boom”, it was the political initiative of transferring the center of national decisions to the inland that “projected the Amazonian region into the twentieth century”. As a matter of fact, Brasilia contributed decisively to direct the nation’s attention to the Amazonian region. The first practical result has perhaps been the spontaneous colonization of the area surrounding the highway Belém-Brasília by thousands of people.

Above all, after 1964, the military governments have tended to give growing and continuous attention to the Amazonian area, because of strategic, social and economic factors, as already mentioned in Chapter III.(29) In 1966, the Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM) replaced the SPVEA. The new organ was based upon the model of Superintendency for the Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), which, according to Gélio, played a pioneer role in two aspects: through the formulation and implementation of integrated plans of development for a problematic region and through the participation of private enterprises in those plans.(30) Since its creation, SUDAM has contributed to the implementation of more than 500 projects of development in the Amazonian region.

Another important measure taken by the Brazilian government
was the reformulation in 1967 of the Zona Franca de Manaus (ZFM), a free trade area established
ten years before in the capital of the state of Amazonas. Owing to this measure, the ZFM has begun
to receive specific fiscal incentives aimed at the establishment of a commercial, industrial and
agricultural center. The new structure of the old free area has had relevant effects upon the general
economy of the Amazonas state such as an increase in the rhythm of construction, in electric energy
consumption, in international and domestic trade, and in the rate of employment.(31)

In 1970, the Program of National Integration (PIN) was instituted, aiming at the creation of a
physical infrastructure and the promotion of colonization, by means of a better link between the
Amazonian and the Northeastern regions.(32) Based on such precedents as the highway
Belém-Brasília, the Program included the building of other large highways: the Transamazônica
(Trans-Amazon Highway) and the Perimetral Norte (North Rim Road) in the East-West axis and the
Cuiabá-Santarém (the capital of the state of Mato Grosso and a city in the state of Pará) in the
North-South axis. As commented by Tambs, both the Transamazônica and the Perimetral Norte
were originally conceived as a welfare project for drought-driven people from the Northeast.(33)
While national security and the solution of social pressures through colonization programs dominated
the initial planning of the former highway, the North Rim Road was also conceived as a shield for
Brazil’s far-flung frontiers and as an additional support as well as a substitute for the river system,
which is navigable only about six months per year. Brazilian planners expected those highways to
form a giant transport ring around the whole Amazonian region as well as to speed settlement and
economic integration of the area with the rest of the country. Some half a million colonists were
expected to have been settled in agricultural communities (agrovilas) scattered along the axis of the
Transamazônica by 1975. Nevertheless, only approximately a tenth of that number have been
effectively homesteaded. Moreover, the shortage of trained agricultural experts, fertilizers and
equipment has led the colonists to their traditional slash and burn farming practices which caused
uncontrollable erosion, hardening of the soils and subsequent crop failures.

Such a situation made the government partly shift its policy towards the Amazonian region
from social welfare to economic development, and from solitary settlers to modern agrobusiness.(34)
The Administration of President Ernesto Geisel established the Program for Agriculture/Cattle
Raising and Agromineral Poles in the Amazon (POLAMAZÔNIA), which is designed to promote
the integrated utilization of the agricultural/cattle raising, agromineral, forest and mineral resources in
fifteen priority areas or poles in the states and territories of the Amazonian region.

To date, however, all these initiatives have not corresponded entirely to the expectations,
and “the government is the first to recognize this and is decisively interested in changing the
situation”, as well noted by Gélio.(35) The Amazonian region con-
continues to show the lowest national rates in terms of populational density and of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The building of the Perimetral Norte has been suspended and the emphasis upon highways—a key factor of the more recent official plans for the region—has ceased, or has at least been considerably reduced, as a result of the world energy crisis, which affects Brazil to an extraordinary extent. The awareness of the limitations faced by its national efforts may have played some part in Brazil’s move towards the “regionalization of the efforts”.

This is what General Carlos de Meira Mattos suggests, when he says:

To divide in order to civilize was perhaps the solution most recommended, as each nation tried to attract its Amazonian area to the respective seashore in the Pacific or in the Atlantic Ocean. Nevertheless, it has now been concluded that such a solution has not been successful. The Venezuelan, Colombian, Peruvian, Bolivian and Ecuadorian Amazonias continue to be unpopulated, poor and isolated, and represent the most backward territories of each country… The political realism which ought to be the main force of modern development recommends a new strategy for the Amazonian development: a Panamazonian Strategy…. which considers the area as a geographical unit, tries to interpret its geographical needs, and plans a scheme of regional development.(36)

Professor Arthur César Ferreira Reis employs similar reasoning:

The Amazonian region does not belong only to Brazil… It also belongs to Peruvians, Bolivians, Ecuadorians, Colombians and Venezuelans. A high level policy, …, can not be executed without the participation of all those parties, for the regional unity determines, to some extent, that such a policy should be a global one.(37)

The author adds that, since the specific situation of each Amazonian territory is similar to that of others, the convenience
of a common policy would be the immediate conclusion. This would be the reasoning that, according to the author, motivated the promotion of a meeting in Manaus in January 1967, known as “Itamaraty II”. On that occasion, all the Brazilian diplomatic representatives to the Amazonian countries examined together the possibilities of such a regional policy, based on the information they could gather about the national policy of each country with respect to its own region. It was verified that there was no governmental institution of the kind of the SUDAM or of the Banco de Crédito da Amazônia in the other countries. The programs of development of their Amazonian areas were not attributed to specialized departments but were simply included—and without any preferential focus—in the general activities of regular governmental organs. Thus, with the sole exception of Peru, where more emphasis was given at a political level to the task of integrating the Amazonian area, the information brought to the “Itamaraty II” demonstrated that the Amazonian territories were neither an immediate goal of the other governments nor a question of national concern. (38)

As a matter of fact, the new attitude of those countries towards their Amazonian regions (in comparison with the situation found in 1967) as well as the relative progress achieved by the Brazilian efforts in the more recent years are indicated as factors that contributed to the signing of the Amazonian Pact. Ricúpero, for instance, observed that the process of regional cooperation has come late due to the unfavourable demographic and economic conditions of the Amazonian areas of each country.
The foundation of Brasília, the creation of the SUDAM and the new highways which have been opened by Brazil in its own territory have contributed to changing the Amazonian framework and urging a move, “without any chance for delay”, for the promotion of cooperation among neighboring countries. The author adds that the exploitation of petroleum and the colonization in Peru, Ecuador and Colombia, the stimulus for cattle raising in Bolivia, the development of metallurgy and other heavy industries, as well as the construction of the hydroelectric plant of Guri in Venezuela, and the projects for the exploitation of aluminum, and the hydroelectric resources in Surinam and Guyana constitute new “focus of dynamism” that have tended to change their respective Amazonian territories.(39) Meira Mattos also suggests that, as was the case of the Brazilian Amazonian region, the Amazonian areas of the neighboring countries have begun to respond to modern technology. According to him, capacities are re-evaluated, potentialities are revealed, interests are re-examined and, what is more important, it is viable to link not only the Brazilian Amazonia, but also a South American Amazonia, by means of a mixed system river-highway. As a result, the author makes the following prediction:

This would mean not only the awakening of the Amazonian hinterland, but also the awakening of a new and unknown South America: a continental South America, made up of the immense internal regions of nine countries, neighbor and friends, but which have never known to link themselves through those regions, as they remained enslaved by the maritime ways in order to communicate with each other.(40)

At this point, I wish to recall that the aim of my work is to analyse the main factors that have led Brazil to propose
the new treaty and not to discuss the entire set of conditions which have allowed the Treaty to become a reality. The internal preconditions mentioned by the two authors have a relative importance, indeed (as is also true of the improvement in bilateral relations with South American countries). However, I think that even if those internal (and regional) circumstances played a role as they did, external factors continue to be the most relevant for the proposal of the Pact, as recognized by Ricúpero and Meira Mattos themselves.(41) I should add that there is no real contradiction between the argument that says that Brazil chose regionalization because of the limitations of its national efforts and the argument that says that the relative recent success of the Brazilian efforts stimulated the idea of regionalization. This apparent contradiction only contributes to show the important role played by factors external to the regional sphere. On the one hand, had there been no international constraint, Brazil would have probably been satisfied with its gradual success in developing and integrating its Amazonian region and preferred to exchange its experience on a mere bilateral basis (by means of subcommissions like the one established with Peru in 1975). On the other hand, if that gradual success was inexistent, there would be little technical basis to justify the proposal of a joint effort, as it was the case found by “Itamaraty II” in 1967. Thus, both limitations and success have worked in the same direction in actual practice.

A final question should be addressed here about the regionalization of efforts. Given the incipient progress of
each Contracting Party in relation to its Amazonian goals, one may doubt the effectiveness of their technical cooperation. This kind of question reinforces my view that the Brazilian move was mainly motivated by a particular political factor. From my perspective, the signing of the Treaty itself could be seen indeed as a satisfactory achievement owing to its expected role of a safe juridical “umbrella” against the international constraint. Even though Brazilian authorities say they expect to benefit from the exchange of technical information among the Contracting Parties—a point that will be seen later when discussing the prospects of the Treaty—, it is my impression that this expectation is more of a declaratory and political nature, for it would reflect a typical assumption of undeveloped nations, i.e., that horizontal cooperation among them is possible and, more than possible, necessary as a political response to those who believed that those nations could only be eternally dependent on the “cooperation” of developed ones. I believe, nevertheless, that horizontal cooperation remains a complementary form rather than an alternative one to vertical cooperation.

The Multinational Enterprise

As was mentioned in the previous section, the government has recently thought it necessary to emphasize economic development rather than social welfare in its policy towards the Amazonian region. Such an emphasis may open the way for further participation of multinational enterprises in the area, taking into account their economic strength and consequent capacity to
face the Amazonian challenges, whenever projects in the area seem to offer solid prospects of a substantial reward. One might ask then whether this would not be contradictory with the aims of increasing national autonomy by means of the Treaty, as multinational enterprises are often said to represent a number of chains of command leading outside the host state. Blake and Walters recall, for instance, that, in various host states, multinational firms have been accused of “economic imperialism, the fostering of inter-country competition, and the promulgation of insensitive and unsavory business practices”. (42) In what may be one of the pioneering discussions of the problem, Peter Evans stated the following:

A range of arguments leads to the conclusion that the increased economic interconnectedness between rich and poor countries fostered by large corporations is not without negative consequences… Despite the need for more information and analysis it does not seem wise to assume that increased international interconnectedness via the multinational corporation automatically increases benefits to both rich and poor countries. (43)

Other authors, however, do not consider the challenge of multinational firms as a serious one. In this sense, Waltz suggests that “one may be struck by the ability of weak states to impede the operation of strong international corporations and by the attention the latter pay to the wishes of the former.” (44) Based upon a study of Theodore Moran, Holsti also seems to believe that governments of developing countries learn how to maximize their bargaining advantages. (45)

This debate provides a good example of the world interest which has been raised by the activity of multinational firms. In
Brazil, a similar discussion took place at the governmental level in 1975, when a Parliamentary Committee of Investigation analysed the behavior and the influence of multinational enterprises and foreign capital in the country. The report of that Committee, approved on November 6, 1975, concluded that “in general, there existed in Brazil efficient defense against any negative action of multinational enterprises”, which ought to be given incentive in order to work “in harmony with the interest of the country”.

This view was endorsed by many of the Brazilian authorities who were heard and questioned by the Committee. The Minister of Mines and Energy affirmed, e.g., that the Brazilian legislation would dispose of all the mechanisms to exert control over the multinational firms. The Minister of Finance indicated that national capital was guaranteed to control strategic sectors of the economy, that there was restriction on abusive transference of gains, that the access of multinational corporations to internal sources of savings was controlled and that the work of those firms was adjusted to Brazilian goals of import substitution and exports promotion. He added that, on the Whole, private national capital and state capital were stronger than the foreign capital invested in Brazil.

In spite of dissenting views, including the President of the Committee himself, one may infer from the report and the opinions above that there would be a prevailing governmental feeling that the multinational enterprises do not represent a threat to the Brazilian sovereignty—-at least not one that is comparable to the “ecological crusades” and other manifestations
of the international constraint. This being the case, there would be no contradiction between the aims of the Amazonian Pact and the participation of those firms in the process of development of the Amazonian region.

The Declaration of Belém (49) and the Prospects of the Treaty

From October 23 to October 24, 1980, the First Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the members of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation was held in Belém (the capital of the Northern state of Pará in Brazil).

As was the case of the Treaty the question of sovereignty became a major theme in that meeting. Inaugurating the meetings, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Relations, Ambassador Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, stressed once again that the greatest function of the Amazonian Pact was to develop the Amazonian areas of the territory of each country and to integrate them fully into their respective national economies and social systems. He also considered urgent the constitution of a common front against the external attempts to impose “abusive and illegitimate constraints” on the right of the Amazonian countries to make a “sovereign and responsible” use of their forests, in benefit of their own people. He added that external initiatives to coordinate, finance and direct the investigation of the Amazonian reality, no matter whether taken by international organizations or by entities held in industrialized countries, lacked not only legitimacy but also scientific and technical knowledge. These initiatives, according to Guerreiro, were based upon a conceptualization of universal solidarity
that has shown its interest in constraining progress and also shown its lack of interest in eliminating poverty in developing countries. The view implied by that conceptualization was the direction and control of the socioeconomic process of the Amazonian region by forces and interests which were foreign to it. (50)

The speech of the Brazilian Minister was in keeping with the declarations made by President João Batista Figueiredo in the conclusion of that meeting. After emphasizing the necessary integration of the Amazonian development into the global process of development of the national economies of each member country, President Figueiredo went on to say that the Amazonian countries themselves should be responsible for scientific research and the development of an adequate technology vis-à-vis the tropical conditions of the Amazonia.

Without underestimating the possible cooperation of scientists from other countries, the Brazilian President expressed the belief that developed nations had little to teach as far as tropical matters. He also commented that, by generating the necessary knowledge, the Amazonian countries would be able to protect their environment through rational and planned activities rather than through the surrendering of any activity. He concluded by denying the impossibility of economic cooperation among developing countries, as cooperation among those countries, most of which are located in tropical areas, would be essential in order to find adequate solutions for the region. (51)
Besides these manifestations of the Brazilian authorities, some of the more significant political positions contained in the Declaration of Belém, signed by the Chancellors of the eight member countries, were addressed to the problem of sovereignty. The third consideration of this Declaration mentioned the main goal of assuring an effective integration of each Amazonian territory to its respective national economy. The fifth and last consideration indicated the awareness of the inseparability of development and conservation of the Amazonian environment and stressed that both tasks constituted the exclusive responsibility of the Amazonian countries. In relation to the seventeen resolutions, six of them explicitly referred to sovereignty. The first resolution presents as a major goal the acceleration of the socioeconomic development of the Amazonian territories in such a way that “the actions foreseen in the corresponding national plans” should be reinforced. The second resolution reiterates the idea that the joint efforts will aim at fully integrating the Amazonian population into their respective national processes of development. The third resolution, which refers basically to the Indian communities and their value in both cultural and economic terms, prudently tends to avoid any multinational approach to that politically sensitive theme by simply recommending special attention to those communities in the plans “of each country” for the Amazonian region. In other words, each country--and not even the Pact--would be responsible for the situation of its own Indian communities. The fourth resolution states again that the
use and exploitation of natural resources in their respective Amazonian territories constitute a sovereign and exclusive right of each member. It adds that the process of Amazonian cooperation seeks to reiterate the full use of this right. The eight resolution also stresses the very same assumption and concludes that any initiative is unacceptable that tends to raise doubts about the sovereignty of the states in tropical areas over the use and conservation of their natural resources. The fifth resolution considers that the compatibilization between the economic development and the conservation of the environment of the Amazonian region is to be provided by each country, a stipulation that once again asserts the national sovereignty of the members over their internal processes which should be free from external interference. I could add to this list the ninth resolution, for, although it does not present the problem of sovereignty in the same way as the other ones, it does establish a similar idea by recommending measures that would tend to eliminate the cultural and technological dependence of developing nations on industrialized centers and to establish criteria and guidelines to be observed by researchers in the light of the values and needs of their own countries. Thus, the ninth resolution and the others have in common the fact that the national realm is emphasized and given value.

Given the emphasis on sovereignty, Professor Adherbal Meira Mattos, of the Federal University of Pará, makes the following comments:

The world is being divided into blocks of integration and we are creating our own block. This [the Amazonian
Pact] is a national action in group that protects the sovereignty of each country at the same time that it looks for a global development. This is the response of the Amazonian countries to the foreign powers which wanted to assume the control over the Amazônia. This is the affirmation that we are the ones who command here.(53)

It is interesting to note that while sovereignty appeared to be a major theme particularly in the speeches made by the Brazilian authorities when the Pact was signed, that goal was given more emphasis by the other representatives of Amazonian countries when the Declaration was made in Belém. As a consequence, an article published in the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de São Paulo at that time concluded that “sovereignty, maturity and autonomy were common denominators”, in a reference to the speeches of the Chancellors and of President Joao Batista Figueiredo.(54) Another article, published in the periodical Interior also noted that the opposition to the interference of developed countries in the Amazonian region had been consecrated as the “essential political principle” of the Treaty, since that principle has reflected the views of virtually all the members of the Pact. The Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia affirmed, for example, that the members ought not to allow Amazonia to become an open laboratory for the researchers of other countries, nor allow any country to lose its sovereignty over their Amazonian territories. Referring to ecological campaigns, the Peruvian Minister declared that the members should not accept impositions from industrialized countries, which were precisely the ones that provoked pollution. The Minister of Surinam also claimed the sovereign right of his country to
exploit its natural resources, in benefit of its people.\textsuperscript{(55)} The unanimity of the member countries on the main principles and aims of the agreement is surely an important element in guaranteeing its implementation and success; moreover, this unanimity on the specific topic of sovereignty suggests the possible applicability to other countries of the interplay between international and regional constraints--which I consider the key factor that led to the Brazilian proposal. I will return to this point in the Conclusions to this paper.

Besides its more declaratory principles, the Declaration of Belém contains a number of operative or practical areas for immediate Amazonian cooperation. One of those areas is the protection of the regional fauna and flora. Besides continuing to promote the creation of parks and reserves, the member countries manifest in the sixth resolution their hope that Guyana and Surinam may soon join the Intergovernmental Technical Committee for the Protection of the Amazonian Fauna and Flora which is made up of only the other member countries at present. The participation of all the countries in that Committee is considered essential to eliminate the illegal trade of the Amazonian species.\textsuperscript{(56)} Another important area refers to the study of the rivers in the region, aiming at the possibility of improving the systems of transportation in the area and of exploiting other potentialities of those rivers, such as hydroelectric energy. The Contracting Parties also expect to establish an adequate infrastructure of other means of transportation as well as of telecommunications. Finally, the Council
of Amazonian Cooperation, which was scheduled to meet in Lima in July 1981, was requested to prepare proposals aimed at stimulating tourism among the Amazonian countries.(57)

Regardless of the importance and interest of the above mentioned areas, the great priority seems to have been attributed to the cooperation in the field of research, especially to the development of a science and a technology adequate for tropical conditions. As reflected in the speeches of the President and of the Minister of Foreign Relations of Brazil, reasonable emphasis was given to this subject. The Brazilian Minister explicitly noted that it would be in terms of science and technology that the Amazonian countries should affirm their capacity to create techniques and solutions adapted to the Equatorial conditions of the region.(58) As I have already pointed out(59), the Brazilian authorities seem to expect positive results from horizontal cooperation within the Pact. According to the Brazilian Chancellor, Brazil might offer the collaboration of the Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia – INPA (National Institute of Research of the Amazonia), the Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico – CNPQ (National Council of Scientific and Technological Development) and of other institutions that, as is the case of the INPA, are subordinated to the latter Council. Another possible Brazilian contribution could be provided by the Instituto Brasileiro de Desenvolvimento Florestal - IBDF (Brazilian Institute of Forestal Development), which deals with the economic use of forests, the protection of the fauna and the flora and the control of biological reserves
and national parks(60) Although he did not enumerate similar institutions or other sources of cooperation from the other Amazonian countries, the Brazilian Minister stressed that he expected a valuable contribution on the part of each country of the region(61). The ninth resolution of the Declaration of Belem even mentioned the possibility of exchanging useful information with African and Asian countries which possess similar areas. The Declaration considers cooperation in the field of research as ideal in order to reduce the Amazonian countries cultural and technological dependence on industrialized nations and adds that scientific research will provide a safe criterion to guide the policies of socioeconomic development and conservation of the environment.

There can be no doubt as to the political and economic importance of scientific and technological development as well as to the propriety of giving such a high priority to cooperation in this field. Nevertheless, this priority may also be a result of the difficult economic situation of the Amazonian nations. In fact, their internal economic deficiencies, aggravated by the present international economic crisis, tend to reduce the available areas for regional cooperation. It is symptomatic that the scientific and technological field seem to have received a higher priority than transportation despite the importance that Brazilian authorities had given to the latter in their national plans some years before. This was certainly due to the more recent difficulties imposed by the energy crisis, besides other constraining factors of a financial nature.
This unfavorable economic situation serves to indicate that the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation will undoubtedly face a number of immediate obstacles, not to mention more remote and eventual problems. According to an article published in the periodical *Interior*, the “first and greatest problem is common to every country: no one knows with scientific certainty the potential of its region”. (62)

Georges Landau raises a similar doubt from a bureaucratic standpoint. He questions the undertaking of joint actions and efforts, “in view of the admittedly rudimentary nature of institutional development in the relatively less developed signatory nations”. (63) Of course, one may argue that the countries in such a situation will benefit from the experience of other members; moreover, the differences among them in this particular field do not seem to be insurmountable in any case.

On his part, Professor Adherbal Meira Mattos suggests that the effective implementation of the Treaty will have to face even political problems, “for the regime of each country will influence decisions”. (64) From the political point of view, however, I think that more important difficulties may come not from the existence of different political regimes but from the territorial controversies that still plague the relationship between some countries. (65) These territorial problems affected the negotiations of the Treaty to such an extent that a specific mention to those problems had to be made through Article XIX (see Appendix A). The controversies between Peru and Ecuador and between Venezuela and Guyana may be of special concern owing
to their recent reappearance(66).  

A final difficulty is caused once again by the poor economic and financial situation of all the member countries(67). Being a Treaty basically aimed at preventing external interference in the Amazonian region, the Amazonian Pact will probably have to submit itself to some kind of interference in order to implement its activities of cooperation. This is the case because the Parties will certainly find it necessary to request the “aid” of multinational corporations and of international institutions of financing like the IDB, the World Bank and many others. The collaboration of these institutions is explicitly recommended by the tenth resolution of the Declaration of Belém. This recommendation seems to give reason to Bourne, when he found long before the proposal of the Amazonian Pact that “it was almost inevitable that the huge costs of undertaking meaningful development in Amazonia would have to be raised abroad”(68). Indeed, one may well disagree from Ostrander’s view that the Pact “is a joint declaration that exploitation by foreign transnational corporations and even assistance from government agencies of industrialized nations will no longer be welcome in the area”(69) As I see it, the Pact is not really intended to exclude these corporations and agencies but basically to warn everyone (in the form of a joint communiqué or a bloc) of the need to respect national priorities. In regard to exploitation by multinational firms, it is worthwhile to remember that Brazilian authorities act as if they do not believe in it or at least as if they consider themselves able to avoid it. In regard to foreign
assistance, they have to rely on it. In sum, this would sound like having closed the main entrance to
the international threat by means of the regional Treaty but leaving the rear entrance open for less
ostensible forms of interference from abroad.

In spite of all these problems, the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation may, in the future,
generate positive results in terms of regional cooperation and, regardless of the effective success of
this cooperation, it constitutes--despite its “holes”--an interesting juridical and political umbrella
against heavier “rains”, as it has been originally conceived by the Brazilian policy-makers.

Notes

(1) The complete text of the Treaty is included in Appendix A. It is an official translation of the
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.

Development” (forthcoming study, p.22 of a mimeographed copy).

(3) Both plans have been described in Chapter III, pp. 64, 68-70.

(4) Rubens Ricúpero, “Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica” (conference made before the
Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives of Brazil, on May 9, 1979), pp.
4-5.

(5) Nancy Ostrander, “The Amazon Pact: Long Range Development Planning Within an Ecosystem”
(study prepared for the Executive Seminar on National and International Affairs, sponsored by the
Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State, April 1981). This very philosophy was
emphasized by such articles as Luiz Alberto Bahia, “Soberania Regional Excludente”, Folha de São
Paulo, Jul. 5, 1978, and Juan Diez Lazaro, “Cooperación Amazônica: un Reto para los Países dei
Area”, La Cronica (Lima), Jul. 11, 1978.

(6) Speech made on July 3rd, 1978, and reproduced in Tratado
de Cooperação Amazônica (Brasília: Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1978), p. 64. This work, edited by the Brazilian Chancery, contains the speeches made when the Treaty was signed in Brasília as well as the press coverage related to it.


(8) Quoted in Cooperação Amazônica, p. 64.

(9) Some concerns about specific controversies were raised in articles such as “El Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica y el Poder Limítrofe con Perú”, El Universal (Guayaquil), Aug. 3, 1978; and “Pacto Amazónico No Reabrirá Disputas Fronterizas de Venezuela”, El Mundo (Caracas), Mar. 28, 1978.

(10) Cooperação Amazônica, p. 64. The primacy of national sovereignty is also pointed out in the speech made on July 3rd, 1978 by the Venezuelan Chancellor Simón Alberto Consalvi (reproduced in Cooperação Amazônica, p. 70) and in Landau, “Bold New Instrument”, p. 15. Landau states that the Treaty reflects the “emphasis on national sovereignty, expressed in the unanimity rule for the decision-making process”.

(11) Rubens Ricupero, “A Cooperação Regional na Amazônia” (conference made during the Seminar on International Affairs, sponsored by the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives of Brazil, on October 19, 1977), pp. 8-9 and 11-12.

(12) According to the speech made by the former Brazilian Chancellor Antônio Azeredo da Silveira when the Treaty was signed. Quoted in Cooperação Amazônica, p. 77.


(16) Quoted in Cooperação Amazônica, pp. 63-64. Similar views
are found in the speeches made by the Colombian Chancellor and by the Prime Minister of Surinam (reproduced in Cooperação Amazônica, pp. 84 and 98).

(17) Quoted in Cooperação Amazônica, pp. 78.


(24) Ferreira Reis, Impacto Amazónico. p. 72.


(26) See p. 64 supra.

(27) Nevertheless, the following problems are pointed out in Morán, Developing the Amazon, p. 72: “SPVEA received few of these earmarked funds, as most of them were diverted to regions of greater interest to the legislators chiefly in the industrial South. …, lack of funds and late release of available funds made planning and execution difficult, …, and the very legislation that created SPVEA tied the hands of the agency. A restriction that limited staffing expenditures to 8 percent of the budget kept the agency permanently understaffed”.


(29) See pp. 65-68 supra.


(31) Favorable comments on the industrial and economic success achieved by the Zona Franca de Manaus (ZFM) are found in “A Selva Já Produz Mais da Metade dos Televisores Vendidos no País”, Interior, Nº 36 (January/February 1981), pp. 23-29. Criticisms of both the ZFM and SUDAM are found in Mahar, Frontier Development, pp. 13-26. Mahar affirms that, as it was the case with SPVEA, there was a wide discrepancy between the goals of SUDAM and its financial and technical resources. As to the ZFM, the author believes that its economic benefits have been almost entirely confined to the vicinity of Manaus, that investments were concentrated on specific industrial sectors such as electronics and synthetic textiles, and that the rapid growth of imports stimulated by the ZFM legislation has conflicted with attempts to improve the Brazilian balance of payments.

(32) According to Mahar (Frontier Development, p. 18), “an additional motive for the establishment of PIN involved considerations of national security and the threat of foreign domination in the region”.

(33) Tambs, “Amazon Basin”, pp. 48-49. Critical views on
road building, especially on the Transamazônica, are made throughout the works of Morán and Bourne (see n. 23 supra) and in Fernando Morais, Ricardo Gontijo, and Roberto de Oliveira Campos, *Transamazônica* (São Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1970).

(34) The following summary of the different governmental policies is provided by Morán, *Developing the Amazon*, p. 73:

“The first SUDAM development plan (1967-71) encouraged private investment in agricultural, livestock, industrial, and forestry resource development... The second plan (1972-74)... gave priority to road building and small farmer colonization... The third plan (1975-1979) returned to a policy of openly favoring regional development through large-scale enterprises”.


(37) Ferreira Reis, *Impacto Amazônico*, p. 65. Other sources on the limitations of isolated national efforts include “Pacto de Interesses”, *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro), Jul. 4, 1978; Carlos Castillo, “Hélio Jaguariibe Comenta sobre o Pacto Amazônico”, *Presencia* (La Paz), Jul. 26, 1978; and the speech made by the Bolivian Chancellor when the Treaty was signed (quoted in *Cooperação Amazônica*, p. 94).

(38) Ferreira Reis, *Impacto Amazônico*, pp. 35-38.


(41) See pp. 74, 91 and 94 supra.


(46) The report was reproduced in Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, XIX, Nº 73/76 (1976), 9-13.


(48) The separate vote (expressing a contrary view) of Representative Alencar Furtado and other Representatives is included in Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, XX, Nº 77/80 (1977), 7-12.

(49) The complete text of the Declaration is included in Appendix B. It is an official translation of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations.

(50) The speech, made in Belém, on October 23rd, 1980, was reproduced in Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, Nº 27 (October/ December 1980), pp. 26-30.

(51) The speech, made in Belém, on October 24th, 1980, was reproduced in Ibid, pp. 23-26.

(52) According to Nancy Ostrander, “sensitivity to outside influence in the Amazonian Region is the repeated theme of the Declaration of Belém.” (“The Amazon Pact”, p.21)


(55) “Oitio Países se Unem para a Construção do Futuro Amazônico”, Interior, Nº 36 (January/Februaury 1981), p. 4. The declarations of the Chancellors are quoted in this article.

(56) Although Brazilian authorities hope that the presence of Surinam and Guyana improve the effectiveness of the Committee in terms of protecting the flora and fauna, I think that the rigorous prevention of illegal activities will continue to be a task as difficult in the near future as it is now.

(57) The meeting of the Council was later postponed in order to permit a previous meeting of a more technical nature. According to its final report, the First Technical Sectorial Meeting, held in Lima from September 1 to 4, 1981, discussed the following themes: a) exchange of information on regional development.
Documents and national experiences were presented by delegations in order to facilitate the preparation of a list of possible areas for cooperation on a priority basis; b) scientific and technological cooperation. Delegations considered that geophysical differences among the countries and the very nature of the Amazonian area required a preliminary identification of areas for cooperation, with the participation of the various institutions or agencies that are responsible for that task in each country; c) infrastructure for transportation and telecommunications. It was also agreed that a prior knowledge of projects and programs in effect in each of the member countries was necessary as a means of achieving regional interlinkage on the basis of a multimodal system; d) preinvestment fund. Different viewpoints were expressed with regard to the timing for the establishment of such a fund as well as to the nature of its functions. The need for further study of the matter was agreed on as a result. As it can be inferred from the report, activities in the context of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation are still in an incipient stage.

(58) Quoted in Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, Nº 27 (October/December 1980), p. 28.

(59) See p.109 supra.

(60) A number of weaknesses such as lack of staff and of technical and financial resources are said to plague the effective implementation of the tasks attributed to the IBDF (Bourne, Assault on the Amazon, especially in Chapter 7). Given the general state of backwardness is the Amazonian region, however, it is possible that the IBDF may provide some contribution to its counterparts (and receive some from them) at least in such sectors as institutional organization and the exchange of technical knowledge.

(61) Quoted in Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, Nº 27 (October December 1980), p. 29. The Chancellor's expectation is apparently shared, as demonstrated by such articles as “Experiencia Científica Puede Aportar Venezuela”, El Universal (Caracas), Jul. 9, 1978.


(64) Quoted in “Reunião do Pacto Amazônico Terá Presença de Figueiredo”, Jornal de Brasília, Oct. 3, 1980.

(65) These controversies led to such articles as “Polémica Fronteriza entre Venezuela y Guiana Podra Paralizar Pacto Amazónico”, El Mundo (Caracas), Dec. 1, 1977; and “El Pacto Amazonónico”, El Tiempo (Quito), Aug. 16, 1978, in which the Ecuadorian engineer Juan B. Villacreces said he considered unfavorable the participation of his country because of the
hegemonic presence of Peru.

(66) In the case of the Peru-Ecuador controversy, renewed conflicts at their borders in January 1981 obliged Brazil, Argentina, Chile and the United States (the four guarantors of the Agreement of 1942, which put an end to, the war initiated one year before between Peru and Ecuador) to promote an emergency meeting, in order to negotiate a peaceful settlement between the two countries. Ecuador continues, however, to consider that agreement as “null and void”.

In the case of the Venezuela-Guyana controversy, the Agreement of Port of Spain, which had frozen the status quo in the contested area of Guyana Essequibo, expired on June 18, 1982; this may provoke a new wave of political unrest in the region, as demonstrated by recent Guyanan complaints in regard to alleged concentration of Venezuelan troops at their borders.


(68) Bourne, Assault on the Amazon, p. 261. In his article, Helival Rios was also less optimistic as to the elimination of international pressures on the Amazônia (“A Soberania na Amazônia”, Jornal do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro), Jul. 9, 1978).

CONCLUSIONS

From the preceding analysis of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation in the light of Brazil's regional and international constraints, I have arrived at some specific and basic conclusions. The first and most important one is that the international arena has tended to impose more pressing constraints on Brazil than has the regional realm and has become the main area of concern for Brazilian diplomacy. This tendency could very well not be perceived if one attempted to analyse and explain the Treaty by means of a balance of power or a power politics approach restricted to the regional subsystem. The Treaty is rather a juridical and political means to respond to challenges located outside the boundaries of that subsystem, in order to protect the Brazilian national goals of development—specifically the development of the Amazonian area--and, above all, of sovereignty. Being a more abstract concept than development, sovereignty would more directly profit from such a declaratory treaty as the Amazonian Pact. In fact, the latter does not close the door to external participation but merely declares the need to respect national goals and plans in regard to the Amazonian region. In contrast to what a typical regionalist approach might suggest, moreover, regionalization is not undertaken for the sake of regionalization (i.e., for the primary goal of establishing a regional framework similar to the ones aimed at by LAFTA and ANCOM). Rather, it is undertaken for the sake of national autonomy, as the domestic policies of the Parties towards their respective areas are mutually supported
through a regional joint communique. Finally, whereas it is theoretically convenient to study the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation in the context of other efforts of weaker entities towards a joint cooperation that may improve their bargaining advantages vis-a-vis their global environment, it is not the case to interpret such an initiative as “paranoia”(1) or xenophobic aggression. The Treaty does not represent a challenge but rather a defensive and moderate safeguard against a previous international constraint, a characteristic which would be in harmony with the moderate international policy of the country that proposed it.

Bearing in mind that a theoretical study of international politics is expected to search for processes and patterns of behavior(2), some general considerations should still be made here. The first refers to the applicability of the interplay between regional and international constraints toward other countries, especially in Latin America. As well as Brazil, Latin American countries have been said recently to “have expanded bilateral and multilateral ties to developed and developing nations worldwide”, in a kind of “new internationalism”.(3) Among the members of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, Venezuela and Ecuador, in particular, seem to have been involved in the more global international dimension, owing to their participation in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Of course I do not have sufficient information to examine whether or not this involvement would effectively produce the same effects as in the Brazilian case. Only preliminary comments on this question
can be advanced, based on the studies made by Ostrander, Ricupero, Tambs and Bond.(4) With respect to Ecuador, although international criticisms about OPEC’s policies may have shown the convenience of strengthening regional ties to counterbalance those criticisms, factors pertaining to the mere regional dimension seem equally relevant. Given the territorial dispute between Ecuador and Peru (probably the most relevant issue of Ecuador’s international agenda), the former “may well regard the Amazon Pact as a tool through which it could strengthen its hand in its effort to reclaim the lost territory”.(5) In the case of Venezuela, Bond indicates that a coherent Venezuelan foreign policy towards Latin America required collaborative ties with Brazil, but he fails to assess whether or not reasons from outside might be behind the Venezuelan decision.(6) Tambs accounts for a possible external constraint on Venezuela--from Soviet supported Cuba and from socialist influence in the Caribbean and Central America. Nonetheless, when he affirms that the Amazonian Pact “marks the commencement of the continentalization of Venezuela” which, previously, “had been entirely integrated into the U.S. dominated Caribbean concert”, he makes me think that the traditional regional realm of Venezuela has not been South America.(7) This being true, there would be no interplay between an international and a regional constraint (in the case of Venezuela or Ecuador) simply an interplay between two regional constraints. It should be stressed, however, that these considerations are preliminary and speculative, for only a more extensive research would permit to identify the exact boundaries of the Venezuelan
and Ecuadorian subsystems(8) and to establish a more comprehensive framework of causes that led those two countries and other Amazonian nations to sign the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation. Only then could one know whether, as in the European case mentioned by Waltz, politics among South American nations “became different in quality”(9) and whether for the Spanish-speaking nations the international constraint became more relevant than the regional one, as has been the case of Brazil.

Another consideration refers to the convenience of analyzing a later state the different political structures that existed at both the international and the regional levels, in order to better evaluate the kind of pressures they exert over their entities. As I explained in Chapter I(10), it was not my intention to make a systemic analysis but rather to see how an entity has perceived and reacted to a major form of constraint (on its sovereignty and development) that both structures have been imposing on it throughout history. My analysis has permitted, I believe, to find some particular factors that help to explain the evolution of a given foreign policy. Among those factors, the heritage of previous relations among the entities in the regional realm, the existence of boundary problems, the achievement of internal progress and integration (as a means to reduce the fear of certain threats), the existence of common interests among the regional entities, the involvement in the more global international environment and the action of outside powers seem especially relevant in order to reveal the prospects for regional cooperation and understanding. Appealing once again
to Waltz’s analogy with economic theory, I believe that those factors are likely to favor a more comprehensive “theory of the firms”. (11) In order to have, however, a more complete view of why changes in quality occurred in terms of regional relations, a “market theory” is convenient, as it would clarify the reasons for the pressures felt by the “firms”. Just to give a concrete example of what I am suggesting, let us take the Brazilian attitude in its regional realm vis-a-vis two distinct international structures. In the nineteenth century no regional cooperation (comparable to the Amazonian Pact) occurred not only because there were regional disputes but also because the external threat against the independence of the new nations (The Holy Alliance) was counterbalanced by the existence of an opposing force (England and the United States) in the international structure of that time. In the last decades, the international structure does not seem to present a counterbalancing force to the external interference in the name of ecology, a fact that has pressured for more mutual support at the regional level.

A final consideration is related to the exact character of the interplay between the regional and the international constraints faced by an entity. Is it finite or infinite? When I began my work I thought that the inevitable conclusion would be the gradual predominance of the international constraint over the regional one, based upon the assumption that the threat of conflicts which are larger in scope and/or domain should cause them to prevail over the ones which were more restricted and could even transform the latter into processes of cooperation.
Indeed, I came close to this conclusion after having studied the Brazilian case up to the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation. Nevertheless, it seems more prudent to take into account Waltz’s valuable comment that structures “are dynamic, not static”.(12) Thus, the interplay between the two constraints may be more dynamic than initially imagined and regional cooperation could retrogress, in the case of two hypothesis: a) if the international constraint is diminished, i.e., if Brazilian policy-makers perceive a smaller probability of external interference from outside South America in their internal affairs; and/or b) if the regional constraint strongly reappears in the form of a new formulation of anti-Brazilian purposes.(13) Given Claude’s reasoning that “regional organization may be too small, in that it may represent a dangerous form of confinement for local rivalries”(14), it may be the case of considering the following comments of the Brazilian Ambassador Pio Correa:

Our watchful and prudent diplomacy should not lose sight, for a single moment, of the facility to crystalize, around us, in the 180º semicircle that involves Brazil in the Continent, affinities made up of everything that excludes us, of everything that is common to the others and makes them different from us: … The Brazilian foreign policy should be attemptive to that, …, by dissolving mistrusts, breaking through resentments, …, creating every day conditions for dialogue, harmony, and collaboration.(15)

As can be seen from the preceding, the conclusions which I have arrived at suggest interesting starting points for other studies about the interplay between different sources of constraint (systemic or subsystemic) and the reactions of entities to such constraints.
NOTES


“The study of international politics while it must account for the unique, new and nonrecurring phenomenon, is also concerned with processes and patterns of behavior found typically in many historical contexts. All attempts to understand the disparate aspects of political life at the international level implicitly assume some regularities of behavior”.


(4) A very summarized list of reasons that have led the other Amazonian countries to adhere to the Brazilian proposal is provided in Ostrander, “The Amazon Pact,” pp. 11-16. In his conferences, Rubens Ricúpero suggests sometimes that domestic circumstances and the improvement in bilateral relations have contributed to the signing of the Treaty. See “A Cooperação Regional na Amazônia” (conference made during the Seminar in International Affairs, sponsored by the House of Representatives of Brazil, in Brasilia, on October 19, 1977) and “Tratado de Cooperação Amazônica” (conference made before the Committee of Foreign Relations of the House of Representatives of Brazil, on May, 1979). Specific references to the motivation of Venezuela are found in Lewis A. Tambs, “Brazil, Venezuela and the Amazon Basin: a Historical and Geopolitical Survey” (study prepared for the School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1978) and Robert D. Bond, “Venezuela, Brazil and the Amazon Basin”, in Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, ed. by Elizabeth G. Ferris, and Jennie K. Lincoln (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981).


(8) As I have said in Chapter I (p. 16), the definition of the regional subsystem is not aprioristic and results from geographical and historical factors.


(10) See p.15 supra.


(13) Wayne A. Selcher believes that, by 1980, systematic opposition to Brazil dwindled to narrow Marxist or nationalistic sectors in South America (‘Brazil in the World: Multipolarity as Seen by a Peripheral ADC Middle Power’, in Foreign Policies, ed. by Ferris and Lincoln, p. 82).


APPENDIX A

Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation

The Republics of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela, CONSCIOUS of the importance to each one of the Parties of their respective Amazonian regions as an integral part of their respective territories,

INSPIRED by the common aim of pooling the efforts being made, both within their respective territories as well as among themselves, to promote the harmonious development of the Amazon region, to permit an equitable distribution of the benefits of said development among the Contracting Parties so as to raise the standard of living of their peoples and so as to achieve total incorporation of their Amazonian territories into their respective national economies,

CONSCIOUS of the usefulness of sharing national experiences in matters pertaining to the promotion of regional development,

CONSIDERING that, so as to achieve overall development of their respective Amazonian territories, it is necessary to maintain a balance between economic growth and conservation of environment,

CONSCIOUS that both socio-economic development as well as conservation of the environment are responsibilities inherent in the sovereignty of each State, and that cooperation among the Contracting Parties shall facilitate fulfillment of these responsibilities, by continuing and expanding the joint efforts being made for the ecological conservation of the Amazon region,

CONFIDENT that cooperation among the Latin American nations on specific matters which they have in common shall contribute to progress on the road towards the integration and solidarity of all Latin America.

CONVINCED that this Treaty represents the beginning of a process of cooperation which shall benefit their respective countries and the Amazon region as a whole,

RESOLVE to sign the following Treaty:
The Contracting Parties agree to undertake joint actions and efforts to promote the harmonious development of their respective Amazonian territories in such a way that these joint actions produce equitable and mutually beneficial results and achieve also the preservation of the environment, and the conservation and rational utilization of the natural resources of those territories.

Paragraph: To this end, they would exchange information and prepare operational agreements and understandings as well as the pertinent legal instruments which will permit the aims of the present Treaty to be attained.

Article II
This Treaty shall be in force in the territories of the Contracting Parties in the Amazonian Basin as well as in any territory of a Contracting Party which, by virtue of its geographical, ecological or economic characteristics is considered closely connected with that Basin.

Article III
In accordance with and without prejudice to the rights granted by unilateral acts, to the provisions of bilateral treaties among the Parties and to the principles and rules of International Law, the Contracting Parties mutually guarantee on a reciprocal basis that there shall be complete freedom of commercial navigation on the Amazon and other international Amazonian rivers, observing the fiscal and police regulations in force now or in the future within the territory of each. Such regulations should, insofar as possible, be uniform and favour said navigation and trade.

Paragraph: This article shall not apply to cabotage.

Article IV
The Contracting Parties declare that the exclusive use and utilization of natural resources within their respective territories is a right inherent in the sovereignty of each state and that the exercise of this right shall not be subject to any restrictions other than those arising from International Law.
Article V
Taking account of the importance and multiplicity of the functions which the Amazonian rivers have in the process of economic and social development of the region, the Contracting Parties shall make efforts aimed at achieving rational utilization of the hydro resources.

Article VI
In order to enable the Amazonian rivers to become an effective communication link among the Contracting Parties and with the Atlantic Ocean, the riparian states interested in any specific problem affecting free and unimpeded navigation shall, as circumstances may warrant, undertake national, bilateral or multilateral measures aimed at improving and making the said rivers navigable.

Paragraph: For this purpose, they shall carry out studies into the means for eliminating physical obstacles to the said navigation as well as the economic and financial implications so as to put into effect the most appropriate operational measures.

Article VII
Taking into account the need for the exploitation of the flora and fauna of the Amazon region to be rationally planned so as to maintain the ecological balance within the region and preserve the species, the Contracting Parties decide to:

a. Promote scientific research and exchange information and technical personnel among the competent agencies within the respective countries so as to increase their knowledge of the flora and fauna of their Amazon territories and prevent and control diseases in said territories.

b. Establish a regular system for the proper exchange of information on the conservationist measures adopted

Article VIII
The Contracting Parties decide to promote coordination of the present health services in their respective Amazonian territories and to take other appropriate measures to improve the sanitary conditions in the region and perfect methods for preventing and combating epidemics.

Article IX
The Contracting Parties agree to establish close cooperation in the fields of scientific and technological research, for the purpose of creating more suitable conditions for the acceleration of the economic and social development of the region.

Paragraph One: For purposes of this Treaty, the technical and scientific cooperation among the Contracting Parties may be as follows:

a. Joint or coordinated implementation of research and development programmes;
b. Creation and operation of research institutions or centres for improvement and experimental production;
c. Organization of seminars and conferences, exchange of information and documentation, and organization of means for their dissemination.

Paragraph Two: The Contracting Parties may whensoever they deem it necessary and convenient, request the participation of international agencies in the execution of studies, programmes and projects resulting from the forms of technical and scientific cooperation defined in Paragraph One of this Article.

Article X
The Contracting Parties agree on the advisability of creating a suitable physical infrastructure among their respective countries, especially in relation to transportation and communications. They therefore undertake to study the most harmonious ways of establishing or improving road, river, air and telecommunication links bearing in mind the plans and programmes of each country aimed at attaining the priority goal of fully incorporating those respective Amazonian territories into their respective national economies.
Article XI
In order to increase the rational utilization of the human and natural resources of their respective Amazonian territories, the Contracting Parties agree to encourage joint studies and measures aimed at promoting the economic and social development of said territories and generating complementary methods for reinforcing the actions envisaged in the national plans of their respective territories.

Article XII
The Contracting Parties recognize the benefit to be derived by developing under equitable and mutually beneficial conditions, retail trade of products for local consumption among the respective Amazonian border populations, by means of suitable bilateral or multilateral agreements.

Article XIII
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate to increase the flow tourists, both national and from third countries, in their respective Amazonian territories, without prejudice to national regulations for the protection of indigenous cultures and natural resources.

Article XIV
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in ensuring that measures adopted for the conservation, of ethnological, and archeological wealth of the Amazon region, are effective.

Article XV
The Contracting Parties shall seek to maintain a permanent exchange of information and cooperation among themselves and with the agencies for Latin American cooperation in the areas pertaining to matters covered by this Treaty.

Article XVI
The decisions and commitments adopted by the Contracting Parties under this Treaty shall not be to the detriment of projects and
undertakings executed within their respective territories, according to International Law and fair practice between neighboring and friendly countries.

Article XVII

The Contracting Parties shall present initiatives for undertaking studies for the elaboration of programmes of common interest for developing their Amazonian territories and in general terms provide for the fulfillment of the actions contemplated in the present Treaty.

Paragraph: The Contracting Parties agree to give special attention to the consideration of initiatives presented by the least developed countries which require joint action and efforts by the Contracting Parties.

Article XVIII

Nothing contained in this Treaty shall in any way limit the rights of the Contracting Parties to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements on specific or generic matters, provided that these are not contrary to the achievement of the common aims for cooperation in the Amazonian region stated in this instrument.

Article XIX

Neither the signing of this Treaty nor its execution shall have any effect on any other international treaties in force between the Parties nor on any differences with regard to limits or territorial rights which may exist between the Parties nor shall the signing or implementation of this Treaty be interpreted or invoked to imply acceptance or renunciation, affirmation or modification, direct or indirect, express or tacit, of the position or interpretation that each Contracting Party may hold on these matters.

Article XX

Notwithstanding the fact that more adequate frequency for meetings can be established at a later date, the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Contracting Parties shall convene meetings when deemed opportune or advisable, in order to establish the basic guidelines for common policies, for assessing and evaluating the general development or the process of Amazonian cooperation and for taking decisions designed to carry out the aims set out in this document.

Paragraph One: Meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers shall be convened at the request of any of the Contracting Parties, provided that the request has the support of no fewer than four Member States.

Paragraph Two: The first meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers shall be held within a period of two years following the date of entry into force of this Treaty. The venue and date of the first meeting shall be established by agreement among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Contracting Parties.

Paragraph Three: Designation of the host country for the meetings shall be by rotation and in alphabetical order.

Article XXI

The Amazonian Cooperation Council comprising of top level diplomatic representatives shall meet once a year. Its duties shall be as follows:

1. To ensure that the aims and objectives of the Treaty are complied with.
2. To be responsible for carrying out the decisions taken at meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers.
3. To recommend to the Parties the advisability and the appropriateness of convening meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers.
4. To take under consideration initiatives and plans present by the Parties as well as to adopt decisions for undertaking bilateral or multilateral studies and plans, the execution of which as the case may be, shall be the duty of the Permanent National Commissions.
5. To evaluate the implementation of plans of bilateral or multilateral interest.
6. To draw-up the Rules and Regulations for its proper functioning.

Paragraph One: The Council shall hold special meetings through the initiative of any of the Contracting Parties with the support of the majority of the rest.

Paragraph Two: The venue of regular meetings shall be rotated in alphabetical order among the Contracting Parties.

Article XXII

The functions of the Secretariat shall be performed pro tempore by the Contracting Party in whose territory the next regular meeting of the Amazonian Cooperation Council is scheduled to be held.

Paragraph: The pro tempore Secretariat shall send the pertinent documentation to the Parties.

Article XXIII

The Contracting Parties shall create Permanent National Commissions charged with enforcing in their respective territories the provisions set out in this Treaty, as well as carrying out the decisions taken at meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers and by the Amazonian Cooperation Council, without jeopardizing other tasks assigned them by the State.

Article XXIV

Whenever necessary, the Contracting Parties may set up special Commissions to study specific problems or matters related to the aims of this Treaty.

Article XXV

Decisions at meetings held in accordance with Articles XX and XXI shall always require the unanimous vote of the Member Countries of this Treaty. Decisions made at meetings held in accordance with Article XXIV shall always require the unanimous vote of the participating countries.

Article XXVI

The Contracting Parties agree that the present Treaty shall not
be susceptible to interpretative reservation or statements.

Article XXVII
This Treaty shall remain in force for an unlimited period of time, and shall be open to adherence.

Article XXVIII
This Treaty shall be ratified by all the Contracting Parties and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil.

Paragraph One: This Treaty shall become effective thirty days after the last instrument of ratification has been deposited by the Contracting Parties.

Paragraph Two: The intention to denounce this Treaty shall be communicated by a Contracting Party to the remaining Contracting Parties at least ninety days prior to formal delivery of the instrument of denunciation to the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil. This Treaty shall cease to have effect for the Contracting Party denouncing it one year after the denunciation has been formalized.

Paragraph Three: This Treaty shall be drawn up in English, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish, all having equal validity.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Ministers of Foreign Affairs have signed the present Treaty.

EXECUTED in the city of Brasilia, on July 3, 1978, to be deposited in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Brazil which shall provide the other signatory countries with true copies.
APPENDIX B

Declaration of Belem

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela,

GATHERED in Belem, on October 23 and 24, 1980, to hold the I Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Signatory Countries of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, according to its Article XX, Second Paragraph,

HOPING to see in operation, in the shortest time possible, the mechanism of Amazonian collaboration instituted by the Treaty,

DETERMINED to promote and facilitate the economic and social development of their Amazonian regions, on an internal basis and through Amazonian cooperation, in order to assure their effective integration in the respective national economies,

CONVINCED that, besides the specific goals in the geographic area of its application, the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation contributes with new dimension to the process of integration of Latin America, and reaffirms the irreplaceable need for Cooperation among developing countries,

AWARE that the development of the Amazon Region and the preservation of its environment are inseparable and are exclusive responsibility of the Amazonian countries, without other limits than those established in Article IV of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, and that all other forms of international cooperation should harmonize with it,

DECLARE

I. It is the objective of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, through the joint efforts of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela, through the permanent mechanism instituted by the Treaty, to create forms of cooperation and exchange of information which seek to accelerate the socio-economic development of the respective Amazonian territories, to preserve their natural resources and reinforce the actions foreseen in the corresponding national plans.
II. The cooperation will be aimed at raising the standard of living of the signatory countries of the Treaty and will grant priority to the interests and needs of their Amazonian populations in order to obtain their full integration into the national development processes, caring for the preservation of their cultural and social values.

III. The autochthonous Amerindian population constitutes an essential element of the Amazon and is a source of knowledge and habits which are basic to the local culture and economy, thus deserving special attention in the present and future planification of the Amazonian region of each country.

IV. The use and exploitation of the natural resources of each national Amazonian territory constitute a sovereign and exclusive right of each Signatory State of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, without any further restrictions than those established by Article IV. The process of regional cooperation aims at the full enjoyment of these rights, patrimony and guarantee of the development of the territories of the Amazonian countries.

V. The development of the economic potentialities of the Amazonian territories of each country and the preservation of its environment are integral objectives which favor and reinforce each other in an indivisible way. The compatibility of these goals will be reached in each State through a planning guided by the characteristics of these territories, with a selective criterion as to the areas most favorable to economic development, as it has already been done through successful experiments in several areas of the region.

VI. To this end, the Amazonian countries, led by their direct and legitimate interest in efficiently protecting the extraordinary richness and variety of the fauna and flora of the region, will seek to promote, the creation of national parks and other conservation units, as they have already been doing, according to recommendations made by scientific studies on integral ecosystems. With this purpose, and after an adequate period of study and consideration, it is hoped that Guyana and Surinam consider it possible to adhere to the Intergovernmental Technical Committee for the
Protection and Defense of the Amazonian Fauna and Flora, created in 1975, and up to now composed of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.

VII. Strong support will be given to the efforts of each one of the signatory countries directed at restraining the illegal trade of live specimens and wild animal hides whose species may be threatened with extinction and at succeeding in having the industrialized countries, where the main consumer markets for said animals and hides are concentrated, effectively collaborate toward these goals.

VIII. At the same time that the conservation of the fauna and flora is guaranteed, it becomes desirable to promote the rational exploitation of tropical forests, as an important factor in the dynamics of the region. To this end, the cooperation among Amazonian countries will be stimulated, so as to bring about joint research, information exchange, training of technicians, etc. The use and exploitation of all natural resources of the Amazon Region are a sovereign and exclusive right of each of the States in the area; therefore, any initiatives which tend to raise doubts about the sovereignty of the States located in tropical zones concerning the use and conservation of their forest resources are unacceptable.

IX. One of the top priorities of the Treaty will be accorded to cooperation in the field of research, specially to the development of science and technology adequate to tropical conditions. The exchange of information with similar areas in Africa and Asia will be promoted in a special way. Emphasis will be given to the fact that this field is an ideal ground for the developing nations to test their capacity to eliminate cultural and technological dependency in relation to the industrialized centers, establishing the criteria and the guidelines in accordance with intrinsic values and necessities, to be obeyed in research. Scientific research will provide safe directive for the policies of socio-economic development, and for the preservation of the environment, while submitting these activities to permanent evaluation, aiming at the revision and improvement of methods and tech-
niques. To these ends the Member States shall entrust the Amazonian Cooperation Council with the
task of elaborating and coordinating an ample joint research program on science and technology, to
be distributed among the main institutes dealing with scientific investigation in Amazonian countries,
according to specific areas defined by the Special Commissions created by the present Meeting.

X. The Amazonian Cooperation Council will be in charge of preparing a cooperation
program concerning the development of the national Amazonian territories, and render possible the
dissemination of national experiences and methods in the fields of planification, financing and
implementation of projects, among the signatory States. The Amazonian Cooperation Council is
equally in charge of studying the creation of a Pre-Investment Fund to finance the formulation of
projects of common interest. The Council will also examine the suggestions which, on this matter,
may be presented by the Governments. To this end, the collaboration of international organizations
such as IADB, the World Bank, UNDP and SELA, will be sought.

XI. As in the past, the Amazonian fluvial network may play, in the future and more effectively,
a role comparable to that of rivers and channels existing in other continents, as an element uniting the
Amazonian countries. For this purpose, the Amazonian Cooperation Council shall carry out a
systematic and complete study of these rivers' potential, of their close interaction with the remaining
components of the Amazonian geographical complex, of the need for portuary facilities, and of the
demarcation and correction of the river beds. This study should not only consider the physical
conditions of navigability, but the aspects of economic feasibility as well, such as the present and
future traffic needs, the projections for the creation of bulk cargo compatible with the peculiarities of
river transportation, and the possibility of other hydric uses. Such study shall pay special attention to
the development of the already existing means and to the solution of the problems and obstacles
existing in the fluvial connection of certain areas with the
XII. The Amazonian Region has considerable natural resources, both renewable and non-renewable, which may be used for its harmonious development. Its numerous rivers, besides providing natural means of transportation, communication, and contact among the countries of the region, also constitute a source of energy. To this effect and in accordance with Article V of the Treaty, the signatory States recommend that the Amazonian Cooperation Council undertake studies relative to the hydric resources of the Amazonian Region.

XIII. The Amazonian Cooperation Council shall promote the coordination of national plannings for the implementation of an adequate physical infrastructure for transportation and telecommunications, which may render possible the interconnection of the Amazonian countries and their Capitals, according to the terms of Article X of the Treaty. This planning, to be carried out by the technical governmental sectors of the Parties on an advisory basis, should take into consideration the immense distances in the region; the possibility of innovative technologies concerning river, land, and air transportation; as well as the experiences carried out by some countries in order to provide the area with an efficient network of transportation and telecommunications.

XIV. In order to promote a deeper knowledge and to bring about the awareness for the necessity of cooperation among the peoples of the Amazonian countries, the Amazonian Cooperation Council will study proposals aimed at stimulating tourism among them, according to Article XIII.

XV. The full knowledge of the reality of each of the Amazonian territories, and of their differences and characteristics for the rational use of their natural resources, and of their utilization for agro-industrial, cattle breeding, and hydro-electric purposes, will be facilitated insofar as the Amazonian countries reach levels of scientific and technological progress capable of asserting their solvency and autonomy. With this objective in mind, and for a better perception of the Amazonian reality, the universities of the member-countries will be encouraged to create study centers or subject matters on Amazonian issues, already existing in some of
them, and to promote the intensification of contacts among these study centers, teachers, researchers, artists, as well as the exchange of scholarships and the dissemination of publications on Amazonian subjects.

XVI. Given the dimension of the Amazonian challenge and the means within reach of the countries in the region, it is understood that the programs to be outlined are inserted in a wide horizon, in a true agenda for the present and the future, starting from proposals which will be successfull as long as they are realistic and feasible.

XVII. Convinced that the ideas and principles put together in the present Declaration may offer inspiration and guidance to the process of Amazonian cooperation which now starts in a coordinated manner, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs gathered in Belem reaffirm their faith and confidence in the destinies of the Amazon Region as a foundation for the construction of prosperous and developed societies and as a factor bringing together the countries in the area, and serving the cause of Latin American unity and integration as well.

Done in the city of Belem, on the 24th day of the month of October, 1980, in English, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish version.
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